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Abstract. The literature specifies extensive-form games in many styles, and
eventually I hope to formally translate games across those styles. Toward
that end, this paper defines NCF, the category of node-and-choice forms.
The category’s objects are extensive forms in essentially any style, and the
category’s isomorphisms are made to accord with the literature’s small handful
of ad hoc style equivalences.
Further, this paper develops two full subcategories: CsqF for forms whose
nodes are choice-sequences, and CsetF for forms whose nodes are choice-sets.
I show that NCF is “isomorphically enclosed” in CsqF in the sense that each
NCF form is isomorphic to a CsqF form. Similarly, I show that CsqFa˜ is
isomorphically enclosed in CsetF in the sense that each CsqF form with no-
absentmindedness is isomorphic to a CsetF form. The converses are found to
be almost immediate, and the resulting equivalences unify and simplify two ad
hoc style equivalences in Kline and Luckraz 2016 and Streufert 2019.
Aside from the larger agenda, this paper already makes three practical con-
tributions. Style equivalences are made easier to derive by [1] a natural concept
of isomorphic invariance and [2] the composability of isomorphic enclosures. In
addition, [3] some new consequences of equivalence are systematically deduced.
1. Introduction
1.1. Specification styles
To set the stage, this subsection recalls that there are many styles in which to
specify an extensive-form game. All styles must specify [a] nodes, which are vari-
ously called “histories”, “vertices”, or “states”; and [b] choices, which are variously
called “actions”, “alternatives”, “labels”, or “programs”. The following paragraphs
arrange the styles into five broad groups according to how the styles specify nodes
and choices.
[1] Some styles specify nodes and choices abstractly without restriction. Classic
examples from economics include the style of Kuhn 1953 and the style of Selten
1975. Examples from computer science and/or logic include the style of Shoham and
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2 1. Introduction
Leyton-Brown 2009, page 125; the “labeled transition system” style1 in Blackburn,
de Rijke, and Venema 2002, page 3; and the “epistemic process graph” style of
van Benthem 2014, page 70. A final example is the “node-and-choice” style of this
paper (see Figure 1.1). Because each of these styles specifies nodes and choices
abstractly without restriction, each can be roughly understood to encompass all
other styles as special cases.2
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Figure 1.1. A node-and-choice form (later called an “NCF form”).
Player P3 selects choice e or choice f without knowing whether she is at
node 3 or node 4.
[2] Other styles specify nodes as sequences of choices. A popular example in eco-
nomics is the style of Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, page 200. Examples from logic
include the “logical game” style of Hodges 2013, Section 2, and the “epistemic for-
est model” style of van Benthem 2014, page 130. Examples from computer science
include the “protocol” style of Parikh and Ramanujam 1985, the “history-based
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Figure 1.2. (a) A choice-sequence form (later called a “CsqF form”).
(b) A choice-set form (later called a “CsetF form”). These special kinds
of node-and-choice forms are developed further in this paper.
1Note 10 more precisely links “labeled transition systems” with “node-and-choice forms”.
2Accordingly, this paper’s “node-and-choice” style essentially encompasses all other extensive-
form styles. Several aspects of this claim should be clarified. [1] An extensive-form game specifies
a tree. This feature excludes recursively specified stochastic games such as those of Mertens 2002.
[2] A node-and-choice form is assumed to be discrete in the sense that every node has a finite
number of predecessors. This assumption excludes non-discrete extensive-form games such as
those of Dockner, Jørgensen, Long, and Sorger 2000, and Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016. [3] A
node-and-choice form assumes that information sets do not share alternatives. This assumption
is insubstantial in the sense of note 21 below. [4] A node-and-choice form assumes that exactly
one player moves at each information set. Accordingly, simultaneous moves by several players are
specified by several information sets, as in Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, page 202.
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multi-agent structure” style of Pacuit 2007, and the “sequence-form representa-
tion” style of Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009, page 129. A final example is the
“choice-sequence” style of this paper (see Figure 1.2(a)). [3] Other styles specify
nodes as sets of choices. Examples include the “choice-set” style of Streufert 2019
(henceforth “SE”), and also the “choice-set” style of this paper (see Figure 1.2(b)).
There are still other possibilities. [4] Some styles specify choices as sets of nodes,
as in the “simple” style of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.3 (see Fig-
ure 1.3(a)). [5] Other styles express both nodes and choices as sets of outcomes,
as in the style of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Section 10. and the style
of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.2 (see Figure 1.3(b)). Possibilities
[1]–[5] are arranged in a spectrum by SE (Streufert 2019), Figure 2. Further, SE
Section 7 explains how each possibility has its own advantages and disadvantages.
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Figure 1.3. In (a), choices are node sets. In (b), both nodes and
choices are outcome sets. These special kinds of node-and-choice forms
are not developed further in this paper.
1.2. General motivation
It is difficult to formally compare the different styles. Indeed, the first such
results have only recently appeared in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 6.3,
in Kline and Luckraz 2016, and in SE (whose Figure 2 provides an overview of
all these results). These contributions show, by ad hoc constructions, that the five
styles in the above figures are of roughly equal generality. To be somewhat more
precise, these papers argue that one style is at least as general as another style, by
showing that each game3 in the first style can be reasonably mapped to a game in
the second style. Then two styles are regarded as equivalent if such an argument
can be made in both directions. Notice that each such argument hinges upon an
ad hoc mapping linking games in one style to games in another style. Lacking is
a way to compare styles that is based on a systematic way of comparing games. I
hope to provide that systematization in a fashion that is compatible with the prior
style equivalences.
Further, I have a larger agenda in mind. Suppose that two styles have been
compared and found to be equivalent. Then I hope to do more than merely translate
each game in one style to an equivalent game in the other style. I hope to translate
3To be meticulous, these papers concern forms rather than games. In other words, they stop
before specifying player preferences.
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properties, defined for games, from one style to the other. I hope to translate
equilibrium concepts from one style to the other. And ultimately, I hope to translate
theorems from one style to the other. In other words, I hope to formally translate
game theory from one style to another.
Such an overarching theory promises to deliver large conceptual benefits. Fore-
most among the benefits is the synthesis of results and questions from the many
disciplines and subdisciplines which are currently studying some version of game
theory. There is much to be gained because there is so much diversity. Further,
I believe that, fundamentally, we should make the focus of our thinking an equiv-
alence class of games, rather than an individual game. Such an equivalence class
will typically contain games in many styles. If we can easily translate across those
styles, the essence of the equivalence class can emerge.4
Formal translation is a daunting task. Fortunately, category theory promises to
be a powerful and natural tool. In order to gain access to this tool, my intermediate-
range objective has been to construct a category [a] whose objects are extensive-
form games in any style, and [b] whose isomorphisms accord with the handful
of style equivalences already in the literature. My first step was Streufert 2018
(henceforth “SP”). That paper defined NCP, which is the category of node-and-
choice “preforms”, where a preform is a rooted tree with choices and information
sets. My second step is the present paper. Here I define NCF, which is the category
of node-and-choice “forms”, where a form augments a preform with players. Later,
a third paper will augment NCF forms with preferences in order to define extensive-
form games.
Elsewhere there is little categorical work on game theory. Lapitsky 1999 and
Jime´nez 2014 define categories of simultaneous-move games. Machover and Ter-
rington 2014 defines a category of simple voting games. Vannucci 2007 defines
categories of various games, but in its category of extensive-form games, every
morphism merely maps a game to itself. Finally, Hedges 2017 develops morphisms
for open games, which resemble extensive-form games but which do not appear to
accommodate players with different information.5
1.3. Categorical Investments
As explained two paragraphs ago, this paper constructs a category of forms [a]
whose objects are forms in any style, and [b] whose isomorphisms accord with the
style equivalences already in the literature. Goals [a] and [b] are discussed in the
next two paragraphs.
Section 2 introduces NCF, which is the category of node-and-choice forms, in
which both nodes and choices are specified abstractly without restriction. Thereby
goal [a] is achieved. Further, one special kind of node-and-choice form is a choice-
sequence form, in which nodes are choice-sequences. Correspondingly, Section 3
introduces CsqF, which is the full NCF subcategory for choice-sequence forms.
Similarly, another special kind of node-and-choice form is a choice-set form, in
4Although it lies outside my current expertise, there appears to be a further conceptual ben-
efit, namely, that categorical translations between games may allow for syntactic translations
between the logical languages that are interpreted in those games. This would accord with the
correspondence theory of van Benthem 2001, and Conradie, Ghilardi, and Palmigiano 2014.
5In addition, there have been categories developed for some relatively specialized games
within the theoretical computer-science literature. Examples include, for example, Abramsky,
Jagadeesan, and Malacaria 2000, Hyland and Ong 2000, and McCusker 2000.
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which nodes are choice-sets. Correspondingly, Section 4 introduces CsetF, which
is the full NCF subcategory for choice-set forms. Finally, consider again the five
styles in Section 1.1. NCF itself corresponds to style [1], CsqF corresponds to
style [2], and CsetF corresponds to style [3]. Left for future research are style [4]
with its node-set choices, and style [5] with its outcome-set nodes and outcome-set
choices. These two additional styles will correspond to two additional subcategories
of NCF, as suggested in Section 5.2’s discussion of future research.
To achieve goal [b], Section 2 defines NCF’s morphisms in such a way that the
category’s isomorphisms accord with the style equivalences in the literature. Since
this paper does not build subcategories for the node-set and outcome-set styles,
only two of the literature’s style equivalences remain: [i] Kline and Luckraz 2016
Theorems 1 and 2, which are essentially an equivalence between node-and-choice
forms and choice-sequence forms, and [ii] SE Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, which are
essentially an equivalence between (no-absentminded) choice-sequence forms and
choice-set forms. As discussed earlier, each of these two equivalences is a matching
pair of results, in which each result states that each form in one style can be
reasonably mapped to a form in the other style. Section 3.2 proposes to strengthen
each such result by requiring that each form in one style is NCF isomorphic to a
form in the other style. This new kind of result is called an “isomorphic enclosure”,
and a matching pair of isomorphic enclosures is called an “isomorphic equivalence”.
Equivalence [i] accords with Corollary 3.3(b), which states that NCF and CsqF are
isomorphically equivalent. Similarly, equivalence [ii] accords with Corollary 4.3(b),
which states that CsqFa˜ and CsetF are isomorphically equivalent. The paragraphs
after these two corollaries provide historical context, more details, and more senses
in which the two corollaries accord with literature’s equivalences [i] and [ii].
Other results show that NCF is pleasant in other ways. Theorem 2.3 shows that
NCF is a well-defined category. Theorem 2.4 shows that an NCF isomorphism
can be characterized by bijections for nodes, choices, and players. Theorem 2.7
shows that there is a forgetful functor from NCF to NCP, which is SP’s category
of node-and-choice preforms. In addition, various results in Sections 2.1–2.3 show
that the category interacts naturally with game-theoretic concepts like the assign-
ment of information sets to players. Also, Section 2.4 shows that the properties of
no-absentmindedness and perfect-information are invariant to NCF isomorphisms.
Finally, the paragraph after Corollary 3.5 shows how the negation of isomorphic en-
closure formalizes the notion that a property is truly “restrictive” and “substantial”
as opposed to merely “notational”.
1.4. Categorical Dividends
Section 1.3 above argues that NCF systematizes prior style equivalences and
that it is a pleasant category in a variety of other ways. Also, Sections 1.2 and
5.2 argue that NCF promises to be of practical importance in the larger agenda
of translating game theory across styles. Further, the following three paragraphs
identify three practical ways that NCF directly contributes to game theory.
First, isomorphic invariance is a natural and powerful concept. For example,
two elementary propositions in Section 3.3 use isomorphic invariance to find [1]
general circumstances in which one subcategory is strictly isomorphically enclosed
by another and [2] general circumstances in which an isomorphic enclosure can
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be restricted to smaller subcategories. The latter proposition is used by Corol-
lary 3.7(b) to easily construct an isomorphic enclosure for the proof highlighted in
the next paragraph. Further, both propositions are used by Section 4.3 to easily
derive new results about perfect-information.
Second, isomorphic enclosures can be composed (note 19). Such compositions
can make it much easier to derive other isomorphic enclosures. For example, the
proof of Corollary 4.3(b)’s reverse direction is just six lines long, and the third para-
graph following the corollary’s proof explains how this simple argument replaces six
difficult pages in SE’s proof of its Theorem 3.2. Thus the isomorphic equivalence of
Corollary 4.3(b) is much easier to prove than the corresponding ad hoc equivalence
of SE Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (this was called equivalence [ii] in Section 1.3).
Third, isomorphic enclosures have consequences for form derivatives, and Section
5.1 deduces them simultaneously for all isomorphic enclosures. More specifically,
each isomorphic enclosure is defined via isomorphisms, and Proposition 2.6 implies
that each such isomorphism has consequences not only for form components (such
as nodes, choices, and players) but also for form derivatives (such as the precedence
relation among nodes, and each player’s collection of information sets). In contrast,
the literature’s ad hoc style equivalences concern only form components.
1.5. Organization
Section 2 develops NCF, the category of node-and-choice forms. Less generally,
Section 3 develops the subcategory CsqF for choice-sequence forms, and Section 4
develops the subcategory CsetF for choice-set forms. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 use the
context of CsqF to introduce the general concept of isomorphic enclosure, and to
introduce general propositions about isomorphic invariance. Further, Section 5.1
uses parts of Sections 3 and 4 to illustrate some general consequences of isomorphic
enclosure. Finally, Section 5.2 discusses future research.
Although many proofs appear within the text, twelve lengthy proofs and their
associated lemmas are relegated to the appendices. Appendix A concerns NCF,
Appendix B concerns CsqF, and Appendix C concerns CsetF.
2. The Category of Node-and-Choice Forms
2.1. Objects
Let T be a set of elements t called nodes. As in SP Section 2.1 (where “SP”
abbreviates Streufert 2018), a pair (T, p) is a functioned tree iff there are to ∈ T
and X ⊆ T such that [T1] p is a nonempty function from Tr{to} onto X and [T2]
(∀t∈Tr{to})(∃m∈N1) pm(t) = to.6 Call p the (immediate) predecessor function.
A functioned tree (uniquely) determines many entities beyond T and p. First, it
determines its root node to and its set X of decision nodes. Second, it determines its
stage function k:T→N0 by [a] k(to) = 0 and [b] (∀t∈Tr{to}) pk(t)(t) = to. Further,
it determines its (strict) precedence relation ≺ on T by (∀t1∈T, t2∈T ) t1 ≺ t2 iff
(∃m∈N1) t1 = pm(t2). Relatedly, it determines its weak precedence relation 4 on
T by (∀t1∈T, t2∈T ) t1 4 t2 iff (∃m∈N0) t1 = pm(t2). Finally, it determines the set
Z of maximal chains in (T,4). This can be split into the set Zft of finite maximal
6I adopt the conventions that N0 is {0, 1, 2, ...}, that N1 is {1, 2, ...}, and that, for any function
f , f0 is the identity function.
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chains and the (possibly empty) set Zinft of infinite maximal chains. These derived
entities and their basic properties are developed in SP Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Let C be a set of elements c called choices. A triple Π = (T,C,⊗) is a (node-
and-choice) preform (SP Section 3.1) iff
[P1] there is a correspondence7 F :TC and a to∈T
such that ⊗ is a bijection from8 F gr onto Tr{to},
[P2] (T, p) is a functioned tree where p:Tr{to}→F−1(C)
is defined9 by pgr = {(t], t)∈T 2|(∃c∈C)(t, c, t])∈⊗gr}, and
[P3] H partitions F−1(C)
where H ⊆ P(T ) is defined by H = {F−1(c)|c∈C}.
Call ⊗ the node-and-choice operator,10 and let t⊗c denote its value at (t, c) ∈ F gr.
Call F the feasibility correspondence, call to the root node, call p the immediate-
predecessor function, and call H the collection of information sets. In addition, let
X equal F−1(C) (inconsequentially, SP uses F−1(C) rather than X). Call X the
decision-node set.11
A node-and-choice preform Π (uniquely) determines many entities. First, it
determines its components T , C, and ⊗. Second, it determines its F , to, p, H, and
X, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Third, [P2] determines the functioned
tree (T, p), which in turn determines k, ≺, 4, Zft, and Zinft, as discussed in the
second-previous paragraph. Finally, define the preform’s previous-choice function
q:Tr{to}→C by qgr = {(t], c)∈T×C|(∃t∈T )(t, c, t])∈⊗gr}. All these entities and
their basic properties are developed in SP Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Among the basic
properties is the convenient fact that (p, q) = ⊗−1. Further properties appear in
SP Lemmas A.1, C.1, and C.2, and also in Lemma A.1 here.
7To be clear, let F :TC mean that F is a correspondence from T to C, which means that
(∀t∈T ) F (t) ⊆ C. Also, for c ∈ C, let F−1(c) = {t∈T |c∈F (t)}. Also, let F−1(C) = ∪c∈CF−1(c).
8In contrast to SP, the present paper notationally distinguishes between a correspondence
and its graph, between a function and its graph, and between a binary relation and its graph.
Thus [P1] distinguishes between the correspondence F and its graph F gr ⊆ T×C. Also, [P2]
distinguishes between the function p and its graph pgr ⊆ T×T , and between the function ⊗ and
its graph ⊗gr ⊆ T×C×T . Also, for example, Proposition 2.2(o) distinguishes between a relation
≺ and its graph ≺gr ⊆ T×T .
9SP Lemma C.1(a) shows that [P1] implies the well-definition and surjectivity of p.
10A preform’s node-and-choice operator ⊗ can be regarded as a special kind of labeled tran-
sition system (e.g. Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema 2001, page 3; van Benthem 2014, page 36).
More precisely, a labeled transition system is a pair (S, (Ra)a∈A) consisting of [1] a set S of states
s and [2] a collection of binary relations Ra, each defined over S, which is indexed by a set A
of labels a. A preform’s node-and-choice operator ⊗ ⊆ T×C×T determines a labeled transition
system (S, (Ra)a∈A) by setting S = T , setting A = C, and setting each Rc = {(t, t])|(t, c, t])∈⊗}.
Conversely, a labeled transition system (S, (Ra)a∈A) determines a node-and-choice operator
⊗ ⊆ T×C×T by setting T = S, setting C = A, and setting ⊗ = {(s, a, s′)|(s, s′)∈Ra}. [P2]
restricts this construction by requiring that {(s′, s)|(∃a∈A)(s, s′)∈Ra} is a functioned tree, and
[P3] further restricts the construction by requiring that the labels a ∈ A serve to specify informa-
tion sets (these two restrictions concern [1] and [3] in note 2).
11SP Lemma C.1(b,c) implies that a preform’s to and X coincide with the underlying tree’s to
and X. Hence the symbols to and X are unambiguous.
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Let I be a set of elements i called players. A quadruple Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) is
a (node-and-choice) form iff
[F1] (T,C,⊗) is a preform where C = ∪i∈ICi,
[F2] (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Ci∩Cj = ∅, and
[F3] (∀t∈T )(∃i∈I) F (t) ⊆ Ci.
Each Ci is the set of choices that are assigned to player i. The definitions in this
paragraph are new to this paper (and an earlier version, Streufert 2016).
A node-and-choice form Φ (uniquely) determines many entities. First, it deter-
mines its components I, T , (Ci)i∈I , and ⊗. Second, [F1] determines C and the
preform (T,C,⊗), which in turn determines F , to, p, q, H, X, k, ≺, 4, Zft, and
Zinft, as discussed in the second-previous paragraph. In addition, define (Xi)i∈I
at each i by Xi = ∪c∈CiF−1(c). Xi is the set of decision nodes that are assigned
to player i. Further, define (Hi)i∈I at each i by Hi = {F−1(c)|c∈Ci}. Hi is the
collection of information sets that are assigned to player i.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose (I, T, (Ci)i,⊗) is a node-and-choice form with its X,
H, (Xi)i∈I , and (Hi)i∈I . Then the following hold.
(a) ∪i∈IXi = X and (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Xi∩Xj = ∅.
(b) (∀i∈I) Hi partitions Xi.
(c) ∪i∈IHi = H and (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Hi∩Hj = ∅. (Proof A.3.)
Here are two minor remarks. [1] A preform can be understood as a one-player
form. Specifically, (T,C,⊗) is a preform iff ({1}, T, (C),⊗) is a form, where (Ci)i =
(C) is taken to mean C1 = C. [2] A player i in a form is said to be vacuous iff
Ci = ∅. A vacuous player i necessarily has Xi = ∅ and Hi = ∅. Vacuous players
can be convenient. For example, one can posit the existence of a chance player, and
yet create a game without chance nodes by letting the chance player be vacuous.
2.2. Morphisms
A (node-and-choice) preform morphism (SP Section 3.3) is a quadruple α =
[Π,Π ′, τ, δ] such that Π = (T,C,⊗) and Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′) are preforms,
[PM1] τ :T→T ′,
[PM2] δ:C→C ′, and
[PM3] { (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr } ⊆ ⊗′gr.
SP Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 give two characterizations of preform morphisms which
feel more category-theoretic. A (node-and-choice) form morphism is a quintuple
β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] s.t. Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) and Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′) are forms,
[FM1] [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform morphism where
Π = (T,C,⊗), C = ∪i∈ICi, Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′), and C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ ,
[FM2] ι:I→I ′, and
[FM3] (∀i∈I) δ(Ci) ⊆ C ′ι(i).
The first paragraph of Proposition 2.2 rearranges the definition of a morphism.
Meanwhile, the second and third paragraphs concern the many derivatives which
can be constructed, via Section 2.1, from the source and target forms. Parts (k) and
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(m) are new, while the remainder are obtained by combining [FM1] with various
SP results for preforms and trees.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) and Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′)
are forms. Let C = ∪i∈ICi and C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . Then [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism
iff the following hold.
(a) ι : I→ I ′ .
(b) τ :T →T ′ .
(c) δ :C→C ′ .
(d) (∀i∈I) δ(Ci) ⊆ C ′ι(i).
(e) { (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr } ⊆ ⊗′gr.
Further, suppose [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. Let Π = (T,C,⊗) and Π ′ =
(T ′, C ′,⊗′). Also, derive F , to, p, q, X, (Xi)i∈I , H, and (Hi)i∈I from Π and Φ.
Also, derive F ′, t′o, p′, q′, X ′, (X ′i′)i′∈I′ , H′, and (H′i′)i′∈I′ from Π ′ and Φ′. Then
the following hold.
(f) { (τ(t), δ(c)) | (t, c)∈F gr } ⊆ F ′gr.
(g) t′o 4′ τ(to).
(h) { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr } ⊆ p′gr.
(i) { (τ(t]), δ(c)) | (t], c)∈qgr } ⊆ q′gr.
(j) τ(X) ⊆ X ′.
(k) (∀i∈I) τ(Xi) ⊆ X ′ι(i).
(l) (∀H∈H)(∃H ′∈H′) τ(H) ⊆ H ′.
(m) (∀i∈I,H∈Hi)(∃H ′∈H′ι(i)) τ(H) ⊆ H ′.
Finally, derive k, ≺, 4, Zft, and Zinft from (T, p). Also, derive k′, ≺′, 4′, Z ′ft,
and Z ′inft from (T ′, p′). Then the following hold.
(n) (∀t∈T ) k′(τ(t)) = k(t) + k′(τ(to)).
(o) { (τ(t1), τ(t2)) | (t1, t2)∈≺gr } ⊆ ≺′gr.
(p) { (τ(t1), τ(t2)) | (t1, t2)∈4gr } ⊆ 4′gr.
(q) (∀Z∈Zft)(∃Z ′∈Z ′ft∪Z ′inft) τ(Z) ⊆ Z ′.
(r) (∀Z∈Zinft)(∃Z ′∈Z ′inft) τ(Z) ⊆ Z ′. (Proof A.4.)
2.3. The category NCF
This paragraph and Theorem 2.3 define the category NCF, which is called the
category of node-and-choice forms. Let an object be a (node-and-choice) form
Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗). Let an arrow be a (node-and-choice) form morphism β =
[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]. Let source, target, identity, and composition be
βsrc = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]src = Φ,
βtrg = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]trg = Φ′,
idΦ = id(I,T,(Ci)i∈I ,⊗) = [Φ,Φ, idI , idT , id∪i∈ICi ], and
β′◦β = [Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′]◦[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] = [Φ,Φ′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ],
where idI , idT , and id∪i∈ICi are identities in Set.
Theorem 2.3. NCF is a category. (Proof A.5.)
Theorem 2.4. Suppose β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. Then (a) β is an
isomorphism iff ι, τ , and δ are bijections. Further (b) if β is an isomorphism, then
β−1 = [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1]. (Proof A.7.)
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Corollary 2.5. Suppose [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. Let Π be the preform in
Φ, and let Π ′ be the preform in Φ′. Then [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an isomorphism iff [1]
[Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform isomorphism and [2] ι is a bijection. (Proof here.)
Proof. Note [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform morphism by [FM1] for [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]. Thus
SP Theorem 3.7(a) shows that [1] is equivalent to the bijectivity of τ and δ. There-
fore [1] and [2] together are equivalent to the bijectivity of ι, τ , and δ. By Theo-
rem 2.4(a), this is equivalent to [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] being an isomorphism. 2
Proposition 2.6 organizes some12 of the consequences of a form isomorphism.
The proposition’s first paragraph concerns form components, while the second and
third paragraphs concern form derivatives. Consequences (a)–(c) repeat the forward
direction of Theorem 2.4(a). Consequences (d), (k), and (m) are new, while the
remainder are obtained by combining the forward direction of Corollary 2.5 with
SP results about preforms and trees. The entire proposition is comparable to
Proposition 2.2 for morphisms, and Section 5.1 will discuss how the proposition
contributes directly to game theory.
To address a minor technical issue, note that many of the proposition’s con-
sequences are formulated by restricting functions. In each case, the codomain of
the restriction is defined so that the restriction is surjective. Some other minor
technical issues are discussed in notes 8, 13, and 14.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an isomorphism, where Φ = (I, T,
(Ci)i∈I ,⊗) and Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′). Let C = ∪i∈ICi and C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ .
Then the following hold.
(a) ι is a bijection from I onto I ′.
(b) τ is a bijection from T onto T ′.
(c) δ is a bijection from C onto C ′.
(d) (∀i∈I) δ|Ci is a bijection from Ci onto C ′ι(i).13
(e) (τ, δ, τ)|⊗gr is a bijection from ⊗gr onto ⊗′gr.
Further, let Π = (T,C,⊗) and Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′). Also, derive F , to, p, q, X,
(Xi)i∈I , H, and (Hi)i∈I from Π and Φ. Also, derive F ′, t′o, p′, q′, X ′, (X ′i′)i′∈I′ ,
H′, and (H′i′)i′∈I′ from Π ′ and Φ′. Then the following hold.
(f) (τ, δ)|F gr is a bijection from F gr onto F ′gr.
(g) τ(to) = t′o.
(h) (τ, τ)|pgr is a bijection from pgr onto p′gr.
(i) (τ, δ)|qgr is a bijection from qgr onto q′gr.
(j) τ |X is a bijection from X onto X ′.
(k) (∀i∈I) τ |Xi is a bijection from Xi onto X ′ι(i).13
(l) τ |H is a bijection from H onto H′.14
(m) (∀i∈I) τ |Hi is a bijection from Hi onto H′ι(i).13,14
12The proposition’s list of consequences is far from exhaustive. For example, in the nota-
tion of the proposition’s second paragraph, Lemma A.2(b) deduces that (∀c∈C) τ(F−1(c)) =
(F ′)−1(δ(c)).
13To be clear, parts (d), (k), and (m) do hold when there is a vacuous player i. In this case,
Ci is empty, and thus, δ|Ci , C′ι(i), Xi, τ |Xi , X′ι(i), Hi, τ |Hi , and H′ι(i) are all empty as well.
14In parts (l), (m), (q), and (r), τ is understood to be the function P(T ) 3 S 7→
{τ(t)|t∈S} ∈ P(T ′). For example, if H ∈ H, then τ(H) = {τ(t)|t∈H}. Similarly, if
Z ∈ Zft∪Zinft, then τ(Z) = {τ(t)|t∈Z}.
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Finally, derive k, ≺, 4, Zft, and Zinft from (T, p). Also, derive k′, ≺′, 4′, Z ′ft,
Z ′inft from (T ′, p′). Then the following hold.
(n) (∀t∈T ) k′(τ(t)) = k(t).
(o) (τ, τ)|≺gr is a bijection from ≺gr onto ≺′gr.
(p) (τ, τ)|4gr is a bijection from 4gr onto 4′gr.
(q) τ |Zft is a bijection from Zft onto Z ′ft.14
(r) τ |Zinft is a bijection from Zinft onto Z ′inft.14 (Proof A.9.)
As already noted, the definition of a form incorporates a preform, and the def-
inition of a form morphism incorporates a preform morphism. Correspondingly,
Theorem 2.7 shows there is a “forgetful” functor P from NCF to NCP. Inciden-
tally, SP Theorem 3.9 shows there is a similar functor F from NCP to Tree. Hence
F◦P is a functor from NCF to Tree.
Theorem 2.7. Define P from NCF to NCP by
P0 : (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) 7→ (T,∪i∈ICi,⊗) and
P1 : [Φ,Φ
′, ι, τ, δ] 7→ [P0(Φ),P0(Φ′), τ, δ].
Then P is a well-defined functor. (Proof A.10.)
2.4. No-absentmindedness and perfect-information
Consider an arbitrary category Z, and a property which is defined for the objects
of Z. The property is said to be isomorphically invariant iff, for each object, the
object satisfies the property iff all of its isomorphs satisfy the property. This section
explores two isomorphically invariant properties: [1] no-absentmindedness and [2]
perfect-information. Both properties restrict information sets.
No-absentmindedness is a standard property which is widely regarded as being
very weak (see, for example, Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 4.2.3). To
define this property in NCP, consider an NCP preform with its≺ andH. Then the
preform is said to have no-absentmindedness iff (/∃H∈H, tA∈H, tB∈H) tA ≺ tB .15
Further, consider an NCF form with its preform. Then the form is said to have
no-absentmindedness iff its preform has no-absentmindedness.
Proposition 2.8. (ao) If [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP morphism and Π ′ has no-
absentmindedness, then Π has no-absentmindedness. (a) No-absentmindedness is
isomorphically invariant in NCP. (bo) If [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism and Φ′
has no-absentmindedness, then Φ has no-absentmindedness. (b) No-absentminded-
ness is isomorphically invariant in NCF. (Proof A.11.)
Let NCPa˜ be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are preforms with
no-absentmindedness. (I am endeavouring to use subscripts for isomorphically in-
variant properties.) Similarly, let NCFa˜ be the full subcategory of NCF whose
objects are forms with no-absentmindedness. No-absentmindedness will appear
again in Section 3.3.
15Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 Figure 1 provides an example of absentmindedness. A cor-
responding NCP preform Π = (T,C,⊗) can be defined by T = {{}, (a), (b), (a, a), (a, b)}, C =
{a, b}, and ⊗ = {({}, a, (a)), ({}, b, (b)), ((a), a, (a, a)), ((a), b, (a, b)}. No-absentmindedness fails
because H contains H = {{}, (a)} and {} ≺ (a). A corresponding NCF form Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i,⊗)
can be defined by setting T and ⊗ as above, setting I = {1}, and setting C1 = {a, b}. The
existence of this example is used in the proof of Corollary 3.5.
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Perfect-information is another standard property. It is restrictive, and at the
same time, there are many interesting games which satisfy it (see, for example,
Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 Part II). As in SP Section 3.5, an NCP preform, with
its collectionH of information setsH, is said to have perfect-information iff (∀H∈H)
|H| = 1. Perfect-information is strictly stronger than no-absentmindedness.16,17
Further, an NCF form is said to have perfect-information iff the form’s preform
has perfect-information. (In spite of Proposition 2.9, the existence of a morphism
does not lead to any logical relationship between the source’s perfect-information
and the target’s perfect-information.)
Proposition 2.9. (a) Perfect-information is isomorphically invariant in NCP.
(b) Perfect-information is isomorphically invariant in NCF. (Proof A.12.)
Let NCPp be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are preforms with
perfect-information. (The subscript a˜p would be equivalent to the subscript p, be-
cause no-absentmindedness is implied by perfect-information, as shown in note 16.)
Further, let NCFp be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are forms with
perfect-information. Perfect-information will appear again in Section 4.3.
3. The Subcategory of Choice-Sequence Forms
3.1. Objects
Let a (finite) sequence be a function from {1, 2, ...m} for some nonnegative inte-
ger m (to be clear, the empty sequence18 with empty domain is admitted by m = 0).
I will regard a sequence as a set of ordered pairs. For example, t∗ = {(1, g), (2, f),
(3, f)} is a sequence with domain {1, 2, 3}. An alternative notation for the same
entity is t∗ = (g, f, f). Yet another is t∗ = (t∗n)
3
n=1 where t
∗
1 = g and t
∗
2 = t
∗
3 = f.
Let the length of a sequence t be |t|. For instance, the length of the example
sequence is |t∗| = |{(1, g), (2, f), (3, f)}| = 3, which is consistent with the observation
that (2, f) 6= (3, f). Note that the length of the empty sequence {} is |{}| = 0. Next,
let the range of a sequence t be R(t) = { tn |n∈{1, 2, ... |t|} }. For instance, the range
of the example sequence is R(t∗) = { t∗n |n∈{1, 2, 3} } = {g, f, f} = {g, f}. Note that
the range of the empty sequence {} is R({}) = ∅.
Let the concatenation t⊕s of two sequences t and s be {(1, t1), ... (|t|, t|t|),
(|t|+1, s1), ... (|t|+|s|, s|s|)}. Thus the concatenation of a sequence t = (t1, t2, ... t|t|)
with a one-element sequence (c) is t⊕(c) = (t1, t2, ... t|t|, c). Next, for any sequence
16To see that perfect-information implies no-absentmindedness, assume no-absentmindedness
is violated. Then there is H ∈ H, tA ∈ H, and tB ∈ H such that tA ≺ tB . Thus tA 6= tB . So
|H| > 1 and perfect-information is violated.
17 A simple example of a form which satisfies no-absentmindedness but not perfect-information
is a form corresponding to a two-person simultaneous-move game. Specifically, define the NCP
preform Π = (T,C,⊗) by T = {{}, (a), (b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)}, C = {a, b, c, d}, and
⊗ = {({}, a, (a)), ({}, b, (b)), ((a), c, (a, c)), ((a), d, (a, d)), ((b), c, (b, c)), ((b), d, (b, d))}. Note
that H consists of H = {{}} and H′ = {(a), (b)}. No-absentmindedness holds because [i] H is a
singleton and [ii] neither (a) ≺ (b) nor (a)  (b). Perfect-information fails because |H′| 6= 1. A
corresponding NCF form Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i,⊗) can be defined by setting T and ⊗ as above, setting
I = {1, 2}, and setting C1 = {a, b} and C2 = {c, d}. The existence of this example is used in
the proof of Corollary 4.4. [A slightly more complicated example with the same combination of
properties can be obtained from any of the five figures in Section 1.1.]
18The empty sequence is the empty set. Further, {} and ∅ are alternative notations for the
empty set. I use {} for a root node, and use ∅ for all other purposes.
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t and any ` ∈ {0, 1, 2, ... |t|}, let 1t` denote the initial segment (t1, t2, ... t`). Thus
for any sequence t, 1t0 = {}.
A choice-sequence NCP preform is an NCP preform (T,C,⊗) such that
[Csq1] T is a collection of (finite) sequences which contains {},
[Csq2] (∀ (t, c, t])∈⊗gr) t⊕(c) = t].
Let CsqP be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are choice-sequence pre-
forms. Proposition 3.1 lists some of the special properties of CsqP preforms. In-
cidentally, property (h) and assumption [Csq1] together imply that each node in a
CsqP preform is actually a choice sequence, as the terminology suggests.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose (T,C,⊗) is a CsqP preform. Derive its F , to, p, q,
k, ≺, and 4. Then the following hold.
(a) to = {}.
(b) (∀t]∈Tr{{}}) p(t]) = 1t]|t]|−1 and q(t]) = t]|t]|.
(c) ⊗gr = { (t, c, t])∈T×C×T | t⊕(c)=t] }.
(d) F gr = { (t, c)∈T×C | t⊕(c)∈T }.
(e) (∀t∈T,m∈{0, 1, ... |t|}) pm(t) = 1t|t|−m.
(f) (∀t∈T ) k(t) = |t|.
(g) (∀t∈T ) t = (q◦p|t|−`(t))|t|`=1.
(h) C = ∪t∈TR(t).
(i) (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ≺ tB iff (|tA|< |tB | and tA = 1tB|tA|).
(j) (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA 4 tB iff (|tA| ≤ |tB | and tA = 1tB|tA|). (Proof B.1.)
Finally, let a choice-sequence NCF form be an NCF form whose preform is a
CsqP preform. Then let CsqF be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are
choice-sequence NCF forms.
3.2. Isomorphic Enclosure
Consider two full subcategories A and B of some overarching category Z. Say
that A is isomorphically enclosed in B (in symbols, A→. B) iff every object of A is
isomorphic to an object of B. Note that A→. B concerns not only the subcategories
A and B but also, implicitly, the overarching category Z within which isomorphisms
are defined. Further note that isomorphic enclosures can be composed in the sense
that A →. B and B →. C imply A →. C.19 Finally, let A ↔. B mean that both
A →. B and A ←. B hold. Call ↔. isomorphic equivalence. Isomorphic equivalence
implies the standard categorical concept of equivalence in MacLane 1998 page 18.
Theorem 3.2. (a) NCP →. CsqP. In particular, suppose Π = (T,C,⊗) is
an NCP preform with its p, q, and k. Define T¯ = { (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1 | t∈T },
define τ¯ :T→T¯ by τ¯(t) = (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1, and define ⊗¯ by surjectivity and ⊗¯gr =
{ (τ¯(t), c, τ¯(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr }. Then Π¯ = (T¯, C, ⊗¯) is an CsqP preform, τ¯ is
a bijection, and [Π, Π¯, τ¯, idC ] is an NCP isomorphism. (b) NCF →. CsqF. In
particular, suppose Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) is an NCF form. Define T¯ , τ¯ , and ⊗¯ as
19To prove composability, recall A→. B means that [a] each A form is isomorphic to a B form.
Similarly, B →. C means that [b] each B form is isomorphic to a C form. [a] and [b] imply that
each A form is isomorphic to a C form, and this is what is meant by A →. C.
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in part (a). Then Φ¯ = (I, T¯, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗¯) is a CsqF form and [Φ, Φ¯, idI , τ¯, id∪i∈ICi ]
is an NCF isomorphism. (Proof B.3.)20
Corollary 3.3. (a) NCP ↔. CsqP. (b) NCF ↔. CsqF. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). NCP→. CsqP by Theorem 3.2(a). Conversely, each CsqP preform
is an NCP preform by definition. (b). This is very similar to (a). Change “preform”
to “form”, P to F, and (a) to (b). 2
This equivalence has a long history. In the more distant past, it was informally
understood that game trees could be specified in terms of either [i] a collection of
nodes and a collection of edges or [ii] a collection of sequences. Harris 1985 page
617 provides an example of this informal understanding. Specification style [i] uses
the nomenclature of graph theory (e.g., Tutte 1984), and style-[i] trees were the
basis on which Kuhn 1953 and Selten 1975 built game forms. Later, style-[ii] trees
became the basis on which Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 built game forms.
Kline and Luckraz 201621 (henceforth “KL16”) develop this equivalence by a
pair of theorems. In recognition of the above authors, they call style-[i] forms “KS
forms” and call style-[ii] forms “OR forms”. Then, one of their theorems (their
Theorem 2) shows that a KS form can be derived from each OR form, while the
other theorem (their Theorem 1) shows that each KS form can be mapped to an
OR form.22 These two theorems are depicted by the two arrows in Figure 3.1(a).
The arrows are dashed to convey that the equivalence is ad hoc.
KS OR
NCF CsqF
L99 99K
KL16 KL16
T2 T1
←−. −→.
⊇ T3.2(b)
C3.3(b)
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1. (a) The ad hoc equivalence of Kline and Luckraz
2016 (KL16). (b) The isomorphic equivalence of Corollary 3.3(b).
T = Theorem. C = Corollary.
Corollary 3.3(b) develops the equivalence further. Specification-[i] forms are
written as NCF forms, and specification-[ii] forms are written as CsqF forms.
Corollary 3.3(b) is then a pair of results: one half (the very easy half) shows that
20Theorems 3.2 and 4.2 draw upon Lemmas A.14 and A.15. These nontrivial lemmas show
how to construct isomorphisms in NCP and NCF from bijections for nodes, choices, and players.
These lemmas appear to have application beyond this paper.
21The terms “choice”, “action”, and “alternative” are fundamentally synonymous. However,
the literature tends to use “choice” when it is assumed that information sets do not share alter-
natives, and conversely, to use “action” when the assumption is relaxed. The assumption itself is
insubstantial in the sense that one can always introduce more alternatives until each information
set has its own alternatives (see SE Section 5.2, first paragraph, for more discussion). This pa-
per makes the assumption for notational convenience, and correspondingly, uses “choice” (see SP
Proposition 3.2(16b) and the paragraphs beforehand). In contrast, KL16 relaxes the assumption
and uses “action”.
22SE Theorems 3.2 and 3.1 adapt and slightly extend KL16 Theorems 2 and 1.
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an NCF form is isomorphic to each CsqF form, while the other half (Theorem 3.2)
shows that each NCF form is isomorphic to a CsqF form. Thus the corollary’s
isomorphic equivalence strengthens the KL16 equivalence by introducing isomor-
phisms.
There are further senses in which the corollary’s isomorphic equivalence accords
with the KL16 equivalence. In the backward direction, KL16 Theorem 2 is appeal-
ing because the nodes in the constructed KS form are identical to the sequences
in the given OR form. This is possible because KS nodes admit OR sequences
as special cases. Nonetheless KL16 Theorem 2 is nontrivial because KS forms do
not admit OR forms as special cases. Here the analogous result is cleaner: NCF
forms have been defined so that NCF forms admit CsqF forms as special cases.
In the forward direction, KL16 Theorem 1 is made appealing by KL16 Lemma 2,
which shows that there is a bijection α from the “vertex histories” in the given KS
form to the nodes in the constructed OR form. That bijection is closely related to
Theorem 3.2’s bijection τ¯ , which maps from the nodes of the given NCF form to
the nodes in the constructed CsqF form.
3.3. More about No-absentmindedness
3.3.1. Proposition 3.4 describes a general situation in which one subcategory
strictly isomorphically encloses another. In the proposition, w and s are two prop-
erties defined for the objects of Z. Further, w ⇐6⇒ s means that w is strictly weaker
than s. In other words, w ⇐6⇒ s means that [a] each object of Z satisfies w if it
satisfies s, and [b] there is an object of Z that satisfies w but not s. Corollary 3.5
applies Proposition 3.4 to the nonvacuous property of no-absentmindedness.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose w and s are properties defined for the objects of Z,
and that s is isomorphically invariant. Let Zw be the full subcategory of Z whose
objects satisfy w, and let Zs be the full subcategory of Z whose objects satisfy s.
Then w ⇐6⇒ s implies Zw ←. 6→. Zs. (Proof here.)
Proof. Suppose w ⇐6⇒ s. To see Zw ←. Zs, take an object of Zs. Since w ⇐ s,
the object is also an object of Zw. Thus (trivially) the object is isomorphic to an
object of Zw. To see Zw 6→. Zs, note the assumption w ⇐6⇒ s implies that there is
an object of Z that satisfies w and violates s. Thus there is an object of Zw that
violates s. Thus since s is isomorphically invariant, this object does not have an
isomorph that satisfies s. Thus the object does not have an isomorph in Zs. 2
Corollary 3.5. (a) NCP ←. 6→. NCPa˜. (b) NCF ←. 6→. NCFa˜. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). Consider Proposition 3.4 at Z equal to NCP, when w is the
vacuous property satisfied by all objects of NCP, and s is the property of no-
absentmindedness. No-absentmindedness is invariant by Proposition 2.8(a). Fur-
ther the vacuous property is strictly weaker than no-absentmindedness because
there exists an absentminded preform (recall note 15). Thus Proposition 3.4 im-
plies that NCPw = NCP strictly isomorphically encloses NCPs = NCPa˜. (b).
This is very similar to (a). Change “preform” to “form”, P to F, and (a) to (b).
2
To better interpret Corollary 3.5, recall Theorem 3.2(b) which states NCF →.
CsqF. Formally, this means each NCF form is isomorphic to a CsqF form. This
can be interpreted to mean that the property of having choice-sequence nodes is
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not “restrictive”. In contrast, Corollary 3.5(b) implies NCF 6→. NCFa˜. Formally,
this means there is at least one NCF form (such as the one in note 15) that
is not isomorphic to an NCFa˜ form. This can be interpreted to mean that the
property of no-absentmindedness is “restrictive”. Informally, the first result states
that choice-sequence-ness is “purely notational”. In contrast, the second result
states that no-absentmindedness is “substantial”, “significant”, and “real”, and
that it “limits the range of decision processes and social interactions that can be
modelled”. The categorical concept of isomorphic enclosure (→. ) serves to formalize
and to standardize these important terms. Note that both an isomorphic enclosure,
and the negation of an isomorphic enclosure, are meaningful.
3.3.2. Next, Proposition 3.6 shows that an isomorphic enclosure can be restricted
by any isomorphically invariant property. Corollary 3.7 uses this result to restrict
Corollary 3.3 by no-absentmindedness. Corollary 3.7 will in turn be used in the
remarkably quick proof of Corollary 4.3.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that A and B are full subcategories of Z, and that w
is an isomorphically invariant property defined for the objects of Z. Let Aw be the
full subcategory of A whose objects satisfy w, and let Bw be the full subcategory of
B whose objects satisfy w. Then A →. B implies Aw →. Bw. (Proof here.)
Proof. Suppose A →. B. To show Aw →. Bw, take an object of Aw. Then [1]
the object is an object of A and [2] the object satisfies w. By [1] and A →. B,
the object has an isomorph in B. By [2] and the isomorphic invariance of w, the
isomorph satisfies w. The conclusions of the previous two sentences imply that the
isomorph is in Bw. 2
Corollary 3.7. (a) NCPa˜ ↔. CsqPa˜. (b) NCFa˜ ↔. CsqFa˜. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a) follows from Corollary 3.3(a), Proposition 3.6, and Proposition 2.8(a).
(b) is very similar to (a). Just change (a) to (b). 2
NCF ←→.
C3.3(b)
CsqF
←. 6→.
C
3
.5
(b
)
←. 6→.
C
3
.8
(b
)
NCFa˜ ←→.
C3.7(b)
CsqFa˜
Figure 3.1(b)
Figure 3.2. Half of the previous figure, augmented with some results
about no-absentmindedness. C = Corollary.
3.3.3. Finally, Corollary 3.8 could be proved by mimicking the proof of Corol-
lary 3.5, in which case Proposition 3.4 would be employed once for part (a) at Z
= CsqP, and again for part (b) at Z = CsqF. Instead, Corollary 3.8 is proved by
composing isomorphic enclosures (note 19), and the proof of the corollary’s part (b)
is illustrated by Figure 3.2. Both proof techniques are straightforward, and a more
interesting example of composition will soon appear in the proof of Corollary 4.3.
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Corollary 3.8. (a) CsqP ←. 6→. CsqPa˜. (b) CsqF ←. 6→. CsqFa˜. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). This is very similar to (b). Change F to P, and (b) to (a). (b). To see
CsqF ←. CsqFa˜, note that CsqF ←. NCF ←. NCFa˜ ←. CsqFa˜ by, respectively,
Corollary 3.3(b), Corollary 3.5(b), and Corollary 3.7(b). To see CsqF 6→. CsqFa˜,
suppose it were. Then NCF→. CsqF→. CsqFa˜ →. NCFa˜ by, respectively, Corol-
lary 3.3(b), the supposition of the previous sentence, and Corollary 3.7(b). This
contradicts Corollary 3.5(b), which states that NCF 6→. NCFa˜. 2
4. The Subcategory of Choice-Set Forms
4.1. Objects
Let a choice-set NCP preform be an NCP preform (T,C,⊗) such that
[Cset1] T is a collection of finite sets which contains {} and
[Cset2] (∀(t, c, t])∈⊗gr) t∪{c} = t].
Then let CsetP be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are choice-set NCP
preforms. Proposition 4.1 lists some of the special properties of CsetP preforms.23
Incidentally, property (f) and assumption [Cset1] together imply that each node in
a CsetP preform is actually a choice set, in accord with the terminology. More sig-
nificantly, property (g) shows that every CsetP preform has no-absentmindedness.
In this sense the combination of [Cset1] and [Cset2] is restrictive.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose (T,C,⊗) is a CsetP preform with its F , to, p, q, k,
≺, 4, and H. Then the following hold.
(a) to = {}.
(b) (∀t]∈Tr{{}}) q(t]) /∈ p(t]) and p(t])∪{q(t])} = t].
(c) (∀t∈T ) k(t) = |t|.
(d) (∀t∈T,m∈{0, 1, ... |t|}) pm(t)⊆ t and trpm(t) = { q◦pn(t) | m>n≥0 }.
(e) (∀t∈T ) t = { q◦pn(t) | |t|>n≥0 }.
(f) C = ∪T .
(g) (T,C,⊗) has no-absentmindedness.
(h) (∀t∈T,H∈H) |t∩F (H)| ≤ 1.
(i) (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ⊆ tB implies tA = p|tB |−|tA|(tB).
(j) (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ≺ tB iff tA ⊂ tB.
(k) (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA 4 tB iff tA ⊆ tB.
(l) ⊗gr = { (t, c, t])∈T×C×T | c/∈t, t∪{c}=t] }.24
(m) F gr = { (t, c)∈T×C | c/∈t, t∪{c}∈T }. (Proof C.2.)
Finally, let a choice-set NCF form be an NCF form whose preform is a CsetP
preform. Then let CsetF be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are choice-
set NCF forms.
23Almost every CsetP property in Proposition 4.1 has a CsqP analog in Proposition 3.1. The
properties are merely presented in different orders because they are proved in different orders.
The exceptions are that properties (g)–(i) have no CsqP analogs in Proposition 3.1.
24Lemma C.1 shows the following are equivalent: [a] c/∈t and t∪{c}=t]. [b] t6=t] and t∪{c}=t].
[c] t6=t] and t=t]r{c}. [d] t⊆t] and {c}=t]rt.
18 4. The Subcategory of Choice-Set Forms
4.2. Isomorphic Enclosure
Theorem 4.2. (a) CsqPa˜ →. CsetP. In particular, suppose Π¯ = (T¯, C¯, ⊗¯)
is a CsqPa˜ preform. Define T = R(T¯ ), and define ⊗ by surjectivity and ⊗gr =
{ (R(t¯), c¯, R(t¯])) | (t¯, c¯, t¯])∈⊗¯gr }. Then Π = (T, C¯,⊗) is a CsetP preform, R|T¯ is a
bijection, and [Π¯,Π,R|T¯ , idC¯ ] is an NCP isomorphism. (b) CsqFa˜ →. CsetF. In
particular, suppose Φ¯ = (I¯ , T¯ , (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ , ⊗¯) is a CsqFa˜ form. Define T and ⊗ as in
part (a). Then Φ = (I¯ , T, (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ ,⊗) is a CsetF form and [Φ¯, Φ, idI¯ , R|T¯ , id∪i¯∈I¯ C¯i¯ ]
is an NCF isomorphism. (Proof C.3.)
Corollary 4.3. (a) CsqPa˜ ↔. CsetP. (b) CsqFa˜ ↔. CsetF. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). This is very similar to (b). Change “form” to “preform”, F to P,
(b) to (a), and the last phrase to “because it has no-absentmindedness by Propo-
sition 4.1(g)”.
(b). Theorem 4.2(b) shows CsqFa˜→. CsetF. Thus it remains to show CsqFa˜←.
CsetF. Since isomorphic enclosures can be composed, it suffices to show [1] CsetF
→. NCFa˜ and [2] NCFa˜ →. CsqFa˜. [2] is the forward direction of Corollary 3.7(b).
[1] holds simply because anyCsetF form is aNCFa˜ form. To see this, take aCsetF
form. It is an NCF form by construction. It has no-absentmindedness because its
preform has no-absentmindedness by Proposition 4.1(g). 2
ORa¯ SEcs
NCF ←→.
C3.3(b)
CsqF
←. 6→.
C
3
.5
(b
)
←. 6→.
C
3
.8
(b
)
NCFa˜ ←→.
C3.7(b)
CsqFa˜ CsetF
L99 99K
SE SE
T3.2 T3.1
←−. −→.
easy T4.2(b)
C4.3(b)
Figure 3.2
.
⊇ ([1] in C4.3(b)’s proof)
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.1. (a) An ad hoc equivalence from SE. (b) The previous
figure, augmented with Corollary 4.3(b) and its proof. T = Theorem.
C = Corollary.
Corollary 4.3(b) is analogous to an ad hoc style equivalence in SE. There, a pair
of results argues that no-absentminded OR forms (“ORa¯ forms” in this subsection)
are equivalent to SE-choice-set forms (“SEcs forms” in this subsection). One of the
results (SE Theorem 3.2) shows that an ORa¯ form can be reasonably derived from
each SEcs form, and the other result (SE Theorem 3.1) shows that each ORa¯ form
can be reasonably mapped to an SEcs form. These two theorems are depicted by
the two dashed arrows in Figure 4.1(a).
Corollary 4.3(b) strengthens this equivalence. CsqFa˜ forms are like ORa¯ forms
in that both specify nodes as choice-sequences, and CsetF forms are like SEcs
forms in that both specify nodes as choice-sets. Then, Corollary 4.3(b)’s isomorphic
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equivalence is a matching pair of results: one half (labelled “easy” in Figure 4.1(b))
shows that a CsqFa˜ form is isomorphic to each CsetF form, while the other half
(Theorem 4.2) shows that each CsqFa˜ form is isomorphic to a CsetF form. Thus
Corollary 4.3(b) strengthens the SE equivalence by introducing isomorphisms.25
Corollary 4.3(b)’s proof highlights how useful it is to compose isomorphic en-
closures. In particular, consider the reverse direction of Corollary 4.3(b), which is
CsqFa˜ ←. CsetF in Figure 4.1(b), and compare it with SE Theorem 3.2, which is
ORa¯ L99 SEcs in Figure 4.1(a). The lemmas and proof for SE Theorem 3.2 span
six difficult pages. In contrast, the reverse direction of Corollary 4.3(b) is proved
in six lines by composing an easily-proved enclosure (CsetF →. NCFa˜ in part [1]
of proof) with a previously-proved enclosure (NCFa˜ →. CsqFa˜ from the forward
half of Corollary 3.7(b)). Figure 4.1(b) shows this composition as the curved arrow
followed by the forward direction of Corollary 3.7(b).
4.3. More about Perfect-Information
Corollaries 4.4 and 4.5 are additional applications of Section 3.3’s general propo-
sitions using isomorphic invariance.
Corollary 4.4. (a) NCPa˜ ←. 6→. NCPp. (b) NCFa˜ ←. 6→. NCFp. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). Consider Proposition 3.4 at Z equal to NCP, when w is the prop-
erty of no-absentmindedness a˜, and s is the property of perfect-information p.
Perfect-information is isomorphically invariant by Proposition 2.9(a). Further no-
absentmindedness is strictly weaker than perfect-information by notes 16 and 17.
Thus Proposition 3.4 implies that NCPa˜ strictly isomorphically encloses NCPp.
(b). This is very similar to (a). Change P to F, and (a) to (b). 2
Corollary 4.5. (a) NCPp ↔. CsqPp ↔. CsetPp. (b) NCFp ↔. CsqFp ↔.
CsetFp. (Proof here.)
Proof. (a). Corollary 3.7(a) and Corollary 4.3(a) imply NCPa˜ ↔. CsqPa˜ ↔.
CsetP. Thus, Propositions 3.6 and 2.9(a) imply that NCPa˜p ↔. CsqPa˜p ↔.
CsetPp, where NCPa˜p is the full subcategory of NCP consisting of those objects
that satisfy both no-absentmindedness and perfect-information, and where similarly
CsqPa˜p is the full subcategory of CsqP consisting of those objects that satisfy
both no-absentmindedness and perfect-information. Since no-absentmindedness
is weaker than perfect-information (note 16), NCPa˜p = NCPp and CsqPa˜p =
CsqPp. (b). This is very similar to (a). Change P to F, and (a) to (b). 2
Incidentally, since isomorphic equivalence implies categorical equivalence, Corol-
lary 4.5(a) implies NCPp, CsqPp, and CsetPp are categorically equivalent. Fur-
ther, SP Theorem 3.13 and Corollary 3.14 show that NCPp, Tree, and Grphca are
categorically equivalent, where Tree is the category of functioned trees which SP
uses in its development of NCP, and where Grphca is the full subcategory of Grph
whose objects are converging arborescences. Thus, NCPp, CsqPp, CsetPp, Tree,
and Grphca are categorically equivalent.
25There is also another sense in which Corollary 4.3(b) accords with the SE equivalence. The
forward half of the corollary is Theorem 4.2, and that theorem transforms choice-sequence nodes
to choice-set nodes via the bijection R|T¯ . That same bijection is used in SE Theorem 3.1.
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NCF ←→.
C3.3(b)
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C
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)
NCFa˜ ←→.
C3.7(b)
CsqFa˜ ←→.
C4.3(b)
CsetF
←. 6→.
C
4
.4
(b
)
←. 6→.
←. 6→.
NCFp ←→.
C4.5(b)
CsqFp ←→.
C4.5(b)
CsetFp
Figure 4.1(b)
Figure 4.2. Most of the previous figure, augmented with some results
about perfect-information. C = Corollary.
Figure 4.2’s arrow diagram illustrates most of the isomorphic-enclosure results
from Sections 3.2 and following. In addition, the diagram has some unlabelled
arrows. They are derived by composing arrows as in the proof of Corollary 3.8.
Many diagonal arrows could be similarly derived.
5. Further Remarks
5.1. Deducing consequences from an isomorphic enclosure
Consider this paper’s first isomorphic enclosure. Theorem 3.2 shows that each
NCF form Φ is isomorphic to a CsqF form Φ¯ by means of an isomorphism which
transforms nodes via the bijection τ¯ . Proposition 2.6 deduces many consequences
from such an isomorphism. For example, its part (o) implies that (∀t1∈T, t2∈T )
t1 ≺ t2 iff τ¯(t1) ≺¯ τ¯(t2), where T is the node set of Φ, ≺ is derived from Φ, and ≺¯
is derived from Φ¯. Although such consequences about form derivatives like ≺ and
≺¯ are tantalizingly natural, the consequences about form derivatives in Proposi-
tion 2.6(f)–(r) take about 10 pages to prove. That work is important because such
consequences are fundamental to drawing more conclusions from the isomorphic
enclosure of NCF in CsqF.
As Section 3.2 explained, the isomorphic enclosure of NCF in CsqF is analogous
to KL16 Theorem 1. No consequences about form derivatives have been deduced
from that ad hoc theorem, and an analog of Proposition 2.6(f)–(r) would likely
require about 10 pages to prove. Moreover, like KL16 Theorem 1, no consequences
about form derivatives have been deduced from KL16 Theorem 2 or from SE The-
orems 3.1 and 3.2. Each of these ad hoc theorems has its own formulation, so
deriving analogs of Proposition 2.6(f)–(r) for the three of them would likely require
another 3×10 = 30 pages.
In contrast, Proposition 2.6(f)–(r) applies not only to the isomorphic enclosure
of NCF in CsqF. It applies to any isomorphic enclosure. Thus it applies to all
the arrows in Figure 4.2, as well as to all isomorphic enclosures in the future.
5.2. Future research
As discussed in Section 1.2, this paper is part of a larger agenda to translate game
theory across specification styles. In this larger context, isomorphic enclosures can
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be seen as a way to translate form components from one style to another, and on the
basis of these isomorphic enclosures, Proposition 2.6(f)–(r) (discussed just above)
can be seen as a way of translating form derivatives from one style to another.
The
5. Further Remarks
results of this paper wait to be expanded in three orthogonal directions.
[1] There is more to translate beyond forms and their derivatives. This would
include properties that forms might satisfy, and theorems that might relate these
properties to one another. (This paper makes some limited progress in this direction
by exploring the isomorphically invariant properties of no-absentmindedness and
perfect-information, and by identifying some special properties of CsqF forms and
CsetF forms via Propositions 3.1 and 4.1.) Expanding in this direction would
correspond to expanding the three substantive sections of this paper.
[2] This paper concerns only three styles: NCF, CsqF, and CsetF. There are
other styles to explore, including the two neglected styles mentioned at the start of
this paper, namely, the “node-set” style of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section
6.3, and the “outcome-set” style of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 and Alo´s-
Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 6.2. Expanding in this direction will require
defining new NCF subcategories for “node-set” forms and “outcome-set” forms,
and will correspond to adding, to the present paper, two new sections for the two
new subcategories.
[3] This paper concerns only forms, which need to be augmented with preferences
in order to define games. At the higher level of games, many more issues emerge.
To return to [1], there is more to translate, including equilibrium concepts and
the theorems which might relate one equilibrium concept to another. To return
to [2], there will be more than five styles because there are alternative ways to
specify preferences over the same form. Expanding in this third direction will
require building a new category for games that incorporates this paper’s category
for forms.
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Lemma A.1. Suppose (T,C,⊗) is an NCP preform with its F , to, p, q, and
H. Then the following hold.
(a) |T | ≥ 2, |C| ≥ 1, |⊗gr| ≥ 1.
(b) (∀H∈H, c∈C) c ∈ F (H) iff F−1(c) = H.
(c) (∀H∈H, t]∈Tr{to}) q(t]) ∈ F (H) iff p(t]) ∈ H.
Proof. (a). In the paragraph after SP equation (1), remark [ii] shows that (/∃t∈T )
p(t) = t. Thus, since p is nonempty by [T1], there are distinct t1 ∈ T and t2 ∈ T
such that t1 = p(t2). Thus, by the definition of p in [P2], there is c ∈ C such that
(t1, c, t2) ∈ ⊗gr.
(b). (Forward direction). Suppose [a] c ∈ C, [b] H ∈ H, and [c] c ∈ F (H).
[c] implies there is [d] t ∈ H such that [e] c ∈ F (t). [e] implies [f] t ∈ F−1(c).
Meanwhile, [a] and [P3] imply [g] F−1(c) ∈ H. Since H is a partition by [P3], [b]
and [g] imply H and F−1(c) are elements of the same partition. Hence [d] and [f]
imply H = F−1(c).
(Reverse direction). Suppose c ∈ C, [a] H ∈ H, and [b] F−1(c) = H. Since
H belongs to a partition by [a] and [P3], there is [c] t ∈ H. [c] and [b] implies
t ∈ F−1(c), which implies c ∈ F (t). This and [c] imply c ∈ F (H).
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(c). (Forward direction). Suppose H ∈ H, [a] t] ∈ Tr{to} and [b] q(t]) ∈ F (H).
[b] and the forward direction of part (b) imply [c] F−1(q(t])) = H. Mean-
while, [a] and SP Proposition 3.1(b) imply p(t])⊗q(t]) = t]. This and [P1] imply
(p(t]), q(t])) ∈ F gr. This implies p(t]) ∈ F−1(q(t])), which equals H by [c].
(Reverse direction). Suppose H ∈ H, [a] t] ∈ Tr{to} and [b] p(t]) ∈ H. [a] and
SP Proposition 3.1(b) imply p(t])⊗q(t]) = t]. This and [P1] imply (p(t]), q(t]))
∈ F gr. This implies q(t]) ∈ F (p(t])). This and [b] imply q(t]) ∈ F (H). 2
Lemma A.2. 26Suppose α = [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform morphism, where Π =
(T,C,⊗) determines F and where Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′) determines F ′. Then the fol-
lowing hold. (a) (∀c∈C) τ(F−1(c)) ⊆ (F ′)−1(δ(c)). (b) Suppose α is an isomor-
phism. Then (∀c∈C) τ(F−1(c)) = (F ′)−1(δ(c)).
Proof. (a). Take c. I argue
τ(F−1(c)) = { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and t∈F−1(c) }
= { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (t, c)∈F gr }
⊆ { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (τ(t), δ(c))∈F ′gr }
= { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr }
⊆ { t′∈T ′ | (t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr }
= (F ′)−1(δ(c)).
The first inclusion holds by (18a) of SP Lemma C.6. The second inclusion holds
because τ(T ) ⊆ T ′ by [PM1]. The equalities are rearrangements.
(b). Take c. I argue
τ(F−1(c)) = { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and t∈F−1(c) }
= { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (t, c)∈F gr }
= { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (τ(t), δ(c))∈F ′gr }
= { t′∈T ′ | (∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t) and (t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr }
= { t′∈T ′ | (t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr }
= (F ′)−1(δ(c)).
The third equality holds by SP Proposition 3.8(c). The fifth holds because τ is
a bijection by SP Theorem 3.7 (second sentence). The remaining equalities are
rearrangements. 2
Proof A.3 (for Proposition 2.1). (a). First I show [1] ∪i∈IXi = X by arguing,
in steps, that ∪i∈IXi by the definition of (Xi)i∈I equals ∪i∈I(∪c∈CiF−1(c)); which
by rearrangement equals ∪c∈∪i∈ICiF−1(c); which by the definition of C equals
∪c∈CF−1(c); which by definition equals F−1(C); which by definition (in Section 2.1)
equals X. Thus it remains to show that (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Xi∩Xj = ∅. Toward that
end, suppose there are i1 ∈ I and i2 ∈ I such that [2] i1 6= i2 and Xi1∩Xi2 6= ∅.
This nonemptiness and [1] imply there is [3] t ∈ X such that [4] t ∈ Xi1∩Xi2 . [3]
and [F3] imply there is i∗ ∈ I such that [5] F (t) ⊆ Ci∗ . [4] implies t ∈ Xi1 , which
26This lemma excerpts parts of proofs from SP. In particular, the proof of part (a) rearranges
part of SP Proof C.12’s argument for SP Proposition 3.5, and the proof of the part (b) rearranges
part of the argument for SP Lemma C.17(e).
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by the definition of Xi1 implies there is [6
1] c1 ∈ Ci1 such that t ∈ F−1(c1). The
previous set membership is equivalent to [71] c1 ∈ F (t). [71] and [5] imply c1 ∈ Ci∗ ,
and thus [61] and [F2] imply [81] i1 = i∗. Similarly, [4] implies t ∈ Xi2 , which by the
definition of Xi2 implies there is [6
2] c2 ∈ Ci2 such that t ∈ F−1(c2). The previous
set membership is equivalent to [72] c2 ∈ F (t). [72] and [5] imply c2 ∈ Ci∗ , and
thus [62] and [F2] imply [82] i2 = i∗. [81] and [82] imply i1 = i2, which contradicts
[2].
(b). Take i. First I show [1] Hi ⊆ H. I do this by arguing, in steps, that Hi
by definition equals {F−1(c)|c∈Ci}; which by the definition of C is a subset of
{F−1(c)|c∈C}; which by definition (in [P3]) equals H. Since H is a partition by
[P3], [1] implies that the elements of Hi are nonempty and disjoint. Thus it remains
to show that ∪Hi = Xi. I argue, in steps, that ∪Hi by the definition of Hi equals
∪{F−1(c)|c∈Ci}; which by the definition of Xi equals Xi.
(c). First I show ∪i∈IHi = H. I do this by arguing, in steps, that ∪i∈IHi by
the definition of (Hi)i∈I equals ∪i∈I{F−1(c)|c∈Ci}; which by rearrangement equals
{F−1(c)|c∈∪i∈ICi}; which by the definition of C equals {F−1(c)|c∈C}; which by
definition (in [P3]) equalsH. Thus it remains to show (∀i∈I, j∈Ir{i}) Hi∩Hj 6= ∅.
Toward that end, suppose i1 ∈ I and i2 ∈ I satisfy [1] i1 6= i2 and Hi1∩Hi2 6= ∅.
This nonemptiness implies there is H ∈ Hi1∩Hi2 . H ∈ Hi1 and part (b) implies
H is a nonempty subset of Xi1 . Similarly, H ∈ Hi2 and part (b) implies H is a
nonempty subset of Xi2 . The previous two sentences imply Xi1∩Xx2 6= ∅. Hence
part (a) implies i1 = i2, which contradicts [1]. 2
Proof A.4 (for Proposition 2.2). The next two paragraphs prove the first
paragraph of the proposition. In particular, the next two paragraphs show that
[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism iff (a)–(e) hold.
Forward Direction. Assume [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. Then [FM1] implies
[(T,C,⊗), (T ′, C ′,⊗′), τ, δ] is a preform morphism, so [PM1] implies (b), [PM2]
implies (c), and [PM3] implies (e). Further, [FM2] implies (a), and [FM3] implies
(d).
Reverse Direction. Assume (a)–(e). Since Φ and Φ′ are forms by assumption, it
suffices to show [FM1]–[FM3]. [FM3] holds by (d). [FM2] holds by (a). For [FM1],
note that Π and Π ′ are preforms by [F1] and the assumption that Φ and Φ′ are
forms. Thus it suffices to show [PM1]–[PM3]. [PM1] holds by (b), [PM2] holds by
(c), and [PM3] holds by (e).
Henceforth assume that [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. The remaining two para-
graphs of the proposition follow from Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 below.
Claim 1: (k) holds. Take i. I argue, in steps, that τ(Xi) by definition equals
τ(∪c∈CiF−1(c)), which by rearrangement equals ∪{ τ(F−1(c)) | c∈Ci }, which by
Lemma A.2(a) is included in ∪{ (F ′)−1(δ(c)) | c∈Ci }, which by rearrangement is
∪{ (F ′)−1(c′) | c′∈δ(Ci) }, which by [FM3] is included in ∪{ (F ′)−1(c′) | c′∈C ′ι(i) },
which by definition is X ′ι(i).
Claim 2: (m) holds. Take i and H ∈ Hi. By the definition of Hi, there exists
[1] c ∈ Ci such that [2] H = F−1(c). Let [3] H ′ = (F ′)−1(δ(c)). [1] and [FM3]
imply δ(c) ∈ C ′ι(i). Thus the definition of H′ι(i) implies (F ′)−1(δ(c)) ∈ H′ι(i). This
and [3] imply H ′ ∈ H′ι(i). Thus it remains to show that τ(H) ⊆ H ′. I argue, in
steps, that τ(H) by [2] equals τ(F−1(c)), which by Lemma A.2(a) is included in
(F ′)−1(δ(c)), which by [3] equals H ′.
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Claim 3: (a) [Π,Π, τ, δ] is an NCP morphism. (b) [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a Tree
morphism. (a) follows from [FM1]. For (b), note that (a) and SP Theorem 3.9
imply that F1([Π,Π
′, τ, δ]) is a Tree morphism. By that theorem’s definition of F,
F1([Π,Π
′, τ, δ]) = [F0(Π),F0(Π ′), τ ] = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ].
Claim 4: (f), (h), (i), (j), and (l) hold. Because of Claim 3(a), these parts follow
from various results in SP. In particular, (f) follows from SP Lemma C.6(18a). (h)
follows from SP Lemma C.9(20a). (i) follows from SP Lemma C.9(20b). (j) follows
from SP Proposition 3.4(22a) since Section 2.1 defines X equal to F−1(C) and thus
X ′ equal to (F ′)−1(C ′). (l) follows from SP Proposition 3.5.
Claim 5: (g) and (n)–(r) hold. Because of Claim 3(b), these parts of the propo-
sition follow from various parts of SP Proposition 2.4. In particular, (g) follows
from SP Proposition 2.4(a). (n)–(p) follow from SP Proposition 2.4(c)–(e). (q)
follows from SP Proposition 2.4(h). (r) follows from SP Proposition 2.4(g). 2
Proof A.5 (for Theorem 2.3). The next two paragraphs draw upon SP Theo-
rem 3.6, which showed that NCP is a well-defined category.
This paragraph shows that, for each form Φ, idΦ is a form morphism. Toward
this end, take a form Φ = [I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗]. By [F1], let Π = (T,∪i∈ICi,⊗) be
its NCP preform. It must be shown that idΦ = [Φ,Φ, idT , idI , id∪i∈ICi ] satisfies
[FM1]–[FM3]. [FM1] holds because [Π,Π, idT , id∪i∈ICi ] is an NCP identity, and
hence, an NCP morphism. [FM2] holds because idI :I→I. [FM3] holds because
(∀j∈I) id∪i∈ICi(Cj) = Cj = CidI(j).
This paragraph shows that, for any two form morphisms β and β′, β′◦β is a
form morphism. Toward this end, take form morphisms β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] and
β′ = [Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′], where Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗), Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′), and
Φ′′ = (I ′′, T ′′, (C ′′i′′)i′′∈I′′ ,⊗′′). By [F1], let Π, Π ′, and Π ′′ be the NCP preforms un-
derlying Φ, Φ′, and Φ′′. It must be shown that β′◦β = [Φ,Φ′′, τ ′◦ι, τ ′◦ι, δ′◦δ] satisfies
[FM1]–[FM3]. For [FM1], it must be shown that the quadruple [Π,Π ′′, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ]
is an NCP morphism. This holds because [a] the quadruple equals [Π ′, Π ′′, τ ′, δ′]◦
[Π,Π ′, τ, δ] in NCP, and because [b] [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] and [Π ′, Π ′′, τ ′, δ′] are NCP
morphisms by [FM1] for β and β′. For [FM2], it must be shown that ι′◦ι:I→I ′′.
This holds because ι:I→I ′ by [FM2] for β, and because ι′:I ′→I ′′ by [FM2] for β′.
For [FM3], it must be shown that (∀i∈I) (δ′◦δ)(Ci) ⊆ C ′′ι′◦ι(i). To prove this, take
i. I argue δ′(δ(Ci)) ⊆ δ′(C ′ι(i)) ⊆ C ′′ι′◦ι(i), where the first inclusion holds because
δ(Ci) ⊆ C ′ι(i) by [FM3] for β, applied at i, and where the second inclusion holds by
[FM3] for β′, applied at i′ = ι(i).
The previous two paragraphs have established the well-definition of identity and
composition. The unit and associative laws are immediate. Thus NCF is a category
(e.g. Mac Lane 1998, page 10). 2
Lemma A.6. Suppose [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism, where Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗)
and Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′). Further suppose that ι and δ are bijections. Then
the following hold.
(a) (∀i∈I) δ|Ci is a bijection from Ci onto C ′ι(i).
(b) (∀i′∈I ′) δ−1|C′
i′
is a bijection from C ′i′ onto Cι−1(i′).
Proof. Define C = ∪i∈ICi and C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . The lemma follows from Claims 3
and 4.
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Claim 1: δ is a bijection from ∪i∈ICi onto ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . [FM1] implies [PM2], which
implies δ is a function from C to C ′. Thus the definitions of C and C ′ imply δ is a
function from ∪i∈ICi to ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . δ is a bijection by assumption.
Claim 2: (∀i∈I) δ(Ci) = C ′ι(i). Take i. [FM3] implies δ(Ci) ⊆ C ′ι(i). Thus it
remains to show that C ′ι(i)rδ(Ci) = ∅. Toward that end, suppose contrariwise
there is c′ such that [a] c′ ∈ C ′ι(i) and [b] c′ /∈ δ(Ci). [a] and Claim 1 implies
that δ−1(c′) is a well-defined element of ∪k∈ICk. Thus there is j ∈ I such that
δ−1(c′) ∈ Cj . This implies [c] c′ ∈ δ(Cj). [c] and [b] imply [d] i 6= j. Also, [c] and
[FM3] imply c′ ∈ C ′ι(j). This and [a] imply [e] c′ ∈ C ′ι(i)∩C ′ι(j). Meanwhile, [d] and
the bijectivity of ι imply [f] ι(i) 6= ι(j). [e] and [f] contradict [F2] for Φ′.
Claim 3: (a) holds. This follows from the bijectivity of δ and Claim 2.
Claim 4: (b) holds. Since ι is bijective, it suffices to prove that (∀i∈I) δ−1|C′
ι(i)
is a bijection from C ′ι(i) onto Ci. By Claim 2, this is equivalent to proving that
(∀i∈I) δ−1|δ(Ci) is a bijection from δ(Ci) onto Ci. This follows from part (a). 2
Proof A.7 (for Theorem 2.4). Let the components of Φ be (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗),
define C = ∪iCi, let the components of Φ′ be (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′), and define
C ′ = ∪i′C ′i′ .
The forward half of (a) and all of (b). Suppose that β is an isomorphism
(Awodey 2010, page 12, Definition 1.3). Recall that β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] and let
β−1 = [Φ∗, Φ∗∗, ι∗, τ∗, δ∗]. Then
[1] [Φ∗, Φ∗∗, ι∗, τ∗, δ∗]◦[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] = idΦ = [Φ,Φ, idI , idT , idC ] and
[2] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]◦[Φ∗, Φ∗∗, ι∗, τ∗, δ∗] = idΦ′ = [Φ′, Φ′, idI′ , idT ′ , idC′ ],
where the first equality in both lines holds by the definition of β−1, and the second
equality in both lines holds by the definition of id. The well definition of ◦ in [1]
implies [a] Φ∗ = Φ′. Analogously, the well definition of ◦ in [2] implies [b] Φ∗∗ = Φ.
The third component of [1] implies ι∗◦ι = idI , and the third component of [2] implies
ι◦ι∗ = idI′ . Thus ι is a bijection from I onto I ′ and [c] ι∗ = ι−1. Similarly, the fourth
components of [1] and [2] imply τ is a bijection from T onto T ′ and [d] τ∗ = τ−1.
Similarly again, the fifth components of [1] and [2] imply δ is a bijection from C
onto C ′ and [e] δ∗ = δ−1. To conclude, the previous three sentences have shown
that ι, τ , and δ are bijections. Further,
β−1 = [Φ∗, Φ∗∗, ι∗, τ∗, δ∗] = [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1],
where the first equality follows from the definition of β−1, and where the second
equality follows from [a]–[e].
The reverse half of (a). Suppose that ι, τ , and δ are bijections. Define β∗ =
[Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1]. Derive Π from Φ and Π ′ from Φ′. The remainder of this
paragraph will show that β∗ is a form morphism by showing that it satisfies
[FM1′] [Π ′, Π, τ−1, δ−1] is a preform morphism,
[FM2′] ι−1:I ′→I, and
[FM3′] (∀i′∈I ′) δ−1(C ′i′) ⊆ Cι−1(i′).
To see [FM1′], first note that [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform morphism by [FM1] for
β. Thus the bijectivity of τ and δ, together with SP Theorem 3.7(a), imply that
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[Π ′, Π, τ−1, δ−1] is an NCP isomorphism. Hence a fortiori, it is a preform mor-
phism. To see [FM2′], first note that ι:I→I ′ by [FM2] for β. Thus the bijectivity of
ι implies that ι−1:I ′→I. Finally, to see [FM3′], consider Lemma A.6. The lemma’s
assumptions are met because the theorem assumes that β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a mor-
phism and because the start of this paragraph assumes that ι and δ are bijections.
Thus the lemma’s part (b) implies that (∀i′∈I ′) δ−1(C ′i′) = Cι−1(i′).
To conclude, β∗ is a form morphism by the previous paragraph. Further,
β∗◦β = [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1]◦[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] = idΦ and
β◦β∗ = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]◦[Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1] = idΦ′ .
Hence β is an isomorphism (and incidentally, β−1 = β∗). 2
Lemma A.8. Suppose [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is a morphism, where Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗)
determines (Hi)i∈I , and where Φ′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′) determines (H′i′)i′∈I′ .
Further suppose that [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism, where Π = (T,C,⊗), C =
∪i∈ICi, Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′), and C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . Then (∀i∈I,H∈Hi) τ(H) ∈ H′ι(i).
Proof. Derive F from Π, and F ′ from Π ′. Since [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism,
Lemma A.2(b) implies [1] (∀c∈C) τ(F−1(c)) = (F ′)−1(δ(c)).
Now take i and H ∈ Hi. Then there is [2] c∗ ∈ Ci such that [3] H = F−1(c∗).
First I show [4] δ(c∗) ∈ C ′ι(i) by arguing, in steps, that δ(c∗) by [2] belongs to
δ(Ci), which by [FM3] is included in C
′
ι(i). Finally, I argue, in steps, that τ(H) by
[3] equals τ(F−1(c∗)), which by [1] equals (F ′)−1(δ(c∗)), which by [4] belongs to
H′ι(i). 2
Proof A.9 (for Proposition 2.6). The proposition follows from Claims 1–4 and
6–7.
Claim 1: (a)–(c) hold. The forward direction of Theorem 2.4(a) implies that ι,
τ , and δ are bijections.
Claim 2: (d) holds. This follows from Lemma A.6(a).
Claim 3: (k) holds. Take i. Since τ is a bijection by Claim 1 (part (b)), it suffices
to argue that
τ(Xi) = ∪{ τ(F−1(c)) | c∈Ci }
= ∪{ (F ′)−1(δ(c)) | c∈Ci }
= ∪{ (F ′)−1(c′) | c′∈C ′ι(i) } = X ′ι(i).
The first equality holds by the definition of Xi and a rearrangement. The second
equality follows from Lemma A.2(b) because [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism by
Corollary 2.5. The third equality holds by Claim 2 (part (d)). The fourth equality
holds by the definition of X ′ι(i).
Claim 4: (m) holds. Take i. Since [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism by Corol-
lary 2.5, Lemma A.8 implies that τ |Hi is a well-defined function from Hi into
H′ι(i). It is injective because τ is injective by Claim 1 (part (b)). To show that
it is surjective, take H ′ ∈ Hι(i). Since [Φ′, Φ, ι−1, τ−1, δ−1] is an isomorphism
by Theorem 2.4(b), [Π ′, Π, τ−1, δ−1] is an isomorphism by Corollary 2.5. Thus
Lemma A.8 can be applied to [Φ′, Φ, τ−1, ι−1, δ−1]. Therefore H ′ ∈ Hι(i) implies
τ−1(H ′) ∈ Hι−1◦ι(i). Hence τ−1(H ′) ∈ Hi. This implies that τ(τ−1(H ′)) = H ′ is
in the range of τ |Hi .
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Claim 5: (a). [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism, where Π = (T,C,⊗) and
Π = (T ′, C ′,⊗′). (b) [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ] is a Tree isomorphism. (a) holds by
Corollary 2.5. For (b), note that (a) and SP Theorem 3.9 imply F1([Π,Π
′, τ, δ])
is a Tree isomorphism. By that theorem’s definition of F, F1([Π,Π
′, τ, δ]) =
[F0(Π),F0(Π
′), τ ] = [(T, p), (T ′, p′), τ ].
Claim 6: (e), (f), (i), (j), and (l) hold. These hold by Claim 5(a) and the
parts of SP Proposition 3.8. In particular, (e) holds by SP Proposition 3.8(b).
(f) holds by SP Proposition 3.8(c). (i) holds by SP Proposition 3.8(d). (j) holds
by SP Proposition 3.8(a) since Section 2.1 defines X as F−1(C) and thus X ′ as
(F ′)−1(C ′). (l) holds by SP Proposition 3.8(e).
Claim 7: (g), (h), and (n)–(r) hold. These hold by Claim 5(b) and various parts
of SP Proposition 2.7. In particular, (g) holds by SP Proposition 2.7(c). (h) holds
by SP Proposition 2.7(e). (n) holds by SP Proposition 2.7(d). (o)–(r) hold by SP
Proposition 2.7(f)–(i). 2
Proof A.10 (for Theorem 2.7). By [F1], P0 maps any form into a preform. By
[FM1], P1 maps any form morphism into a preform morphism. Thus it suffices to
show that P preserves source, target, identity, and composition (Mac Lane 1998
page 13). This is done in the following four claims.
Claim 1: P1(β)
src = P0(β
src). Take β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ]. Then I argue, in steps,
that P1(β)
src by the definition of β is equal to P1([Φ,Φ
′, ι, τ, δ])src, which by the
definition of P1 is equal to [P0(Φ),P0(Φ
′), τ, δ]src, which by the definition of src
in NCP is equal to P0(Φ), which by the definition of src in NCF is equal to
P0([Φ,Φ
′, ι, τ, δ]src), which by the definition of β is equal to P0(βsrc).
Claim 2: P1(β)
trg = P0(β
trg). This is very similar to Claim 1. Simply change src
to trg.
Claim 3: P1(idΦ) = idP0(Φ). Take Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) and let C = ∪iCi. First
I show [a] P0(Φ) = (T,C,⊗) by arguing, in steps, that P0(Φ) by the definition of Φ
is P0(I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗), which by the definition of P0 is (T,∪i∈ICi,⊗), which by the
definition of C is (T,C,⊗). Then I argue, in steps, that P1(idΦ) by the definition of
id in NCF is equal to P1([Φ,Φ, idI , idT , idC ]), which by the definition of P1 is equal
to [P0(Φ),P0(Φ), idT , idC ], which by [a] is equal to [(T,C,⊗), (T,C,⊗), idT , idC ],
which by the definition of id in NCP is equal to id(T,C,⊗), which by [a] is equal to
idP0(Φ).
Claim 4: P1(β
′◦β) = P1(β′)◦P1(β). Take β = [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] and β′ = [Φ′, Φ′′,
ι′, τ ′, δ′]. First I note that, since P1 is well-defined by the first paragraph, P1([Φ,Φ′,
ι, τ, δ]) = [P0(Φ),P0(Φ
′), τ, δ] and P1([Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′]) = [P0(Φ′),P0(Φ′′), τ ′, δ′] are
preform morphisms. Then I argue that
P1(β
′◦β) = P1([Φ′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′]◦[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ])
= P1([Φ,Φ
′′, ι′◦ι, τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ])
= [P0(Φ),P0(Φ
′′), τ ′◦τ, δ′◦δ]
= [P0(Φ
′),P0(Φ′′), τ ′, δ′]◦[P0(Φ),P0(Φ′), τ, δ]
= P1([Φ
′, Φ′′, ι′, τ ′, δ′]◦P1[Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ])
= P1(β
′)◦P1(β),
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where the first equality holds by the definitions of β and β′, the second by the
definition of ◦ in NCF, the third by the definition of P1, the fourth by the previous
sentence and by the definition of ◦ in NCP, the fifth by the definition of P1, and
the sixth by the definitions of β and β′. 2
Proof A.11 (for Proposition 2.8). (ao). Suppose [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a preform mor-
phism, with Π = (T,C,⊗) determining ≺ and H, and with Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′)
determining ≺′ and H′. It suffices to show that the absentmindedness of Π implies
the absentmindedness of Π ′. Toward that end, suppose Π has absentmindedness.
Then there are [1] H ∈ H, [2] tA ∈ H, and [3] tB ∈ H such that [4] tA ≺ tB . [1]
and SP Proposition 3.5 imply there exists [5] H ′ ∈ H′ such that [6] τ(H) ⊆ H ′.
[2] implies τ(tA) ∈ τ(H) and thus [6] implies [7] τ(tA) ∈ H ′. Similarly, [3] implies
τ(tB) ∈ τ(H) and thus [6] implies [8] τ(tB) ∈ H ′. In addition, [4] and SP Propo-
sition 2.4(d) (via SP Corollary 3.10) imply [9] τ(tA) ≺′ τ(tB). [5], [7], [8], and [9]
imply Π ′ has absentmindedness.
(a). Suppose Π and Π ′ are isomorphic. Then (a fortiori) there is a morphism
to Π from Π ′ and also a morphism from Π to Π ′. By part (ao) and the first
morphism, the no-absentmindedness of Π implies the no-absentmindedness of Π ′.
Similarly, by part (ao) and the second morphism, the no-absentmindedness of Π is
implied by the no-absentmindedness of Π ′.
(bo). This follows from part (ao) and the definition of no-absentmindedness for
forms.
(b). This follows from part (bo) just as part (a) follows from part (ao). 2
Proof A.12 (for Proposition 2.9). Claim 1. If [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism
and Π ′ has perfect-information, then Π has perfect-information. Suppose
[Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism, with Π = (T,C,⊗) determining H and Π ′ =
(T ′, C ′,⊗) determining H′. Further suppose Π does not have perfect-information.
It suffices to show that Π ′ does not have perfect-information. Because Π does
not have perfect-information, there are t1 ∈ T , t2 ∈ T , and [a] H ∈ H such that
[b] t1 6= t2 and [c] {t1, t2} ⊆ H. SP Proposition 3.8(e) implies τ |H is a bijection
from H onto H′. Hence [a] implies [d] τ(H) ∈ H′. Further, SP Theorem 3.7 implies
that τ is a bijection from T onto T ′. Hence [b] implies [e] τ(t1) 6= τ(t2). Yet further,
[c] implies [f] {τ(t1), τ(t2)} ⊆ τ(H). [d], [e], and [f] imply that Π ′ does not have
perfect-information.
(a). This follows from Claim 1.
(b). This follows from part (a) and the definition of perfect-information for
forms. 2
Lemma A.13. Suppose that (T, p) is a functioned tree and that τ :T→T ′ is a bi-
jection. Define the function p′ by surjectivity and p′gr = { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr }.
Then (T ′, p′) is a functioned tree.
Proof. Since (T, p) is a functioned tree, there exist to ∈ T and X ⊆ T to satisfy
[T1]–[T2]. Define t′o = τ(to) and X ′ = τ(X). It suffices to show
[T1′] p′ is a nonempty function from T ′r{t′o} onto X ′, and
[T2′] (∀t′∈T ′r{t′o})(∃m≥1) (p′)m(t′) = t′o.
These two statements are shown by Claims 6 and 8.
Claim 1: τ |Tr{to}:Tr{to}→T ′r{t′o} is a bijection. This follows from the bijec-
tivity of τ and the definition of t′o.
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Claim 2: τ |X :X→X ′ is a bijection. This follows from the bijectivity of τ and
the definition of X ′.
Claim 3: τ |X◦p◦(τ |Tr{to})−1 is a nonempty function from T ′r{t′o} onto X ′.
The claim follows from composition. In particular, (τ |Tr{to})−1:T ′r{t′o}→Tr{to}
is a bijection by Claim 1, p:Tr{to}→X is nonempty and surjective by [T1], and
τ |X :X→X ′ is a bijection by Claim 2. These bijections appear on the bottom, left,
and top of Figure A.1.
T ′r{t′o}
X ′⊆T ′X ⊆T
Tr{to}
τ |X
(τ |Tr{to})−1
p p′
Figure A.1. Set diagram for Claims 3 and 5.
Claim 4: p′gr = (τ |X◦p◦(τ |Tr{to})−1)gr. I argue
p′gr = { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr }
= { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | t]∈Tr{to}, t=p(t]) }
= { (τ(t]), τ◦p(t])) | t]∈Tr{to} }
= { (τ(t]), τ◦p(t])) | t′]∈T ′r{t′o}, t]=(τ |Tr{t′o})−1(t′]) }
= { (τ◦(τ |Tr{t′o})−1(t′]), τ◦p◦(τ |Tr{t′o})−1(t′])) | t′]∈T ′r{t′o} }
= { (t′], τ◦p◦(τ |Tr{t′o})−1(t′])) | t′]∈T ′r{t′o} }
= (τ◦p◦(τ |Tr{t′o})−1)gr.
The first equality holds by the lemma’s definition of p′gr. The second holds since
the domain of p is Tr{to} by [T1]. The third is a rearrangement. The fourth holds
by Claim 1. The fifth and sixth are rearrangements. The last holds because the
domain of (τ |Tr{t′o})−1 is T ′r{t′o} by Claim 1.
Claim 5: p′ = τ |X◦p◦(τ |tr{to})−1, that is, Figure A.1 commutes. This follows
from Claim 4 because [a] p′ is surjective by assumption and [b] τ |X◦p◦(τ |tr{to})−1
is surjective by Claim 3.
Claim 6: [T1 ′] holds. This follows from Claims 3 and 5.
Claim 7: (∀t∈Tr{to})(∃m≥1) to = p◦[(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−1(t). Take t 6= to.
By [T2] there exists m ≥ 1 such that to = pm(t). On the one hand, suppose m = 1.
Then the claim holds by the definition of m. On the other hand, suppose m ≥ 2.
Then proving the claim requires several steps. First, I show
(a) (∀n |m−1≥n≥ 1) pn(t) = (τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦pn(t).
Take any such n. Since τ is bijective, it suffices to show that the composition
(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦pn(t) is well-defined. In other words, it suffices to show [i] that
pn(t) ∈ X and [ii] that τ |X◦pn(t) is in the domain of (τ |Tr{to})−1. [i] holds because
the codomain of p is X by [T1]. To see [ii], note that to = pm(t) and m−1≥n≥ 1
imply that pn(t) is in the domain of p. Thus, since the domain of p is Tr{to} by
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[T1], we have pn(t) ∈ Tr{to}. Hence the definition of t′o and the bijectivity of τ
imply τ |X◦pn(t) ∈ T ′r{t′o}. This and Claim 1 imply [ii]. Second, I argue
(b) (∀n |m−1≥n≥ 1) pn(t) = [(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]◦pn−1(t).
This holds because the right-hand side of (b) is a rearrangement of the right-hand
side of (a). Third, I argue
pm−1(t) = [(τTr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]◦pm−2(t)(c)
= [(τTr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]2◦pm−3(t)
... = [(τTr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−2◦p(t)
= [(τTr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−1(t),
where the first equality holds by (b) at n=m−1, the second by (b) at n=m−2, ...,
and the last by (b) at n=1. Finally, I argue the claim holds because
to = pm(t) = p◦pm−1(t) = p◦[(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−1(t),
where the first equality holds by the definition of m, the second is a rearrangement,
and the third holds by (c).
Claim 8: [T2 ′] holds. Take t′ ∈ T ′r{t′o}. Then Claim 1 implies (τ |Tr{to})−1(t′)
∈ Tr{to}. Thus by Claim 7, there exists m ≥ 1 such that
to = p◦[(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−1◦(τ |Tr{to})−1(t′).
I now argue
t′o = τ |X(to)
= τ |X◦p◦[(τ |Tr{to})−1◦τ |X◦p]m−1◦(τ |Tr{to})−1(t′)
= [τ |X◦p◦(τ−1|Tr{to})−1]m(t′)
= (p′)m(t′).
The first equation holds by the definition of t′o and the fact that to ∈ X in any
functioned tree (by remark [iv] in the paragraph following SP equation (1)). The
second equation holds by the definition of m, the third is a rearrangement, and the
fourth holds by Claim 5. 2
Lemma A.14. Suppose Π = (T,C,⊗) is an NCP preform. Also suppose
τ :T→T ′ and δ:C→C ′ are bijections. Define ⊗′ by surjectivity and ⊗′gr =
{ (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t]) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr }. Also define Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′). Then (a) Π ′ is an
NCP preform and (b) [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism.
Proof. (a). By [P1] there exist F :TC and to ∈ T such that ⊗ is a bijection
from F gr onto Tr{to}. Define F ′:T ′C ′ by F ′gr = {(τ(t), δ(c))|(t, c)∈F gr}. Also
define t′o = τ(to). It suffices to show that
[P1′] ⊗′ is a bijection from F ′gr onto T ′r{t′o},
[P2′] (T ′, p′) is a functioned tree where p′:T ′r{t′o}→(F ′)−1(C ′)
is defined by p′gr = {(t′], t′)∈(T ′)2|(∃c′∈C ′)(t′, c′, t′])∈⊗′gr}, and
[P3′] {(F ′)−1(c′)|c′∈C ′} partitions (F ′)−1(C ′).
This is done by Claims 6, 7, and 9.
Appendix A. NCF 31
Claim 1: (τ, δ)|F gr :F gr→F ′gr is a bijection. This follows from the bijectivity of
τ , the bijectivity of δ, and the definition of F ′.
Claim 2: τ |τr{to}:Tr{to}→T ′r{t′o} is a bijection. This follows from the bijec-
tivity of τ and the definition of t′o.
Claim 3: τ |τr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1 is a bijection from F ′gr onto T ′r{t′o}. The
claim follows from composition. In particular, ((τ, δ)|F gr)−1:F ′gr→F gr is a bijection
by Claim 1, ⊗:F gr→Tr{to} is a bijection by the definitions of F and to, and
τTr{to}:Tr{to}→T ′r{t′o} is a bijection by Claim 2. These three functions appear
on the top, left, and bottom of Figure A.2.
T ′r{t′o}
F ′gr⊆T ′×C ′F gr⊆T×C
Tr{to}
[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1
τ |Tr{to}
⊗ ⊗′
Figure A.2. Set diagram for Claims 3 and 5.
Claim 4: ⊗′gr = (τ |Tr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1)gr. I argue
⊗′gr = { (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) | (t, c, t])∈⊗gr }
= { (τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) | (t, c)∈F gr, t]=⊗(t, c) }
= { ((τ, δ)(t, c), τ |Tr{to}◦⊗(t, c)) | (t, c)∈F gr }
= { ((τ, δ)(t, c), τ |Tr{to}◦⊗(t, c)) | (t′, c′)∈F ′gr, (t, c)=[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1(t′, c′) }
= { ((τ, δ)◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1(t′, c′), τ |Tr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1(t′, c′) | (t′, c′)∈F ′gr }
= { ((t′, c′), τ |Tr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1(t′, c′) | (t′, c′)∈F ′gr }
= ( τ |Tr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1 )gr.
The first equality holds by the lemma’s definition of ⊗′. The second holds by the
definition of F , and the third by the definition of to. The fourth holds by Claim 1.
The fifth and sixth are rearrangements. The seventh holds by Claim 1.
Claim 5: ⊗′ = τ |Tr{to}◦⊗◦[(τ, δ)|F gr ]−1, that is, Figure A.2 commutes. This
follows from Claim 4 because [a] ⊗′ is surjective by definition and [b] τ |Tr{to} is
surjective by Claim 2.
Claim 6: [P1 ′] holds. This follows from Claims 3 and 5.
Claim 7: [P2 ′] holds. Define p by [P2]. [P2] implies that [a] (T, p) is a functioned
tree. Define p′ by [P2′]. Claim 6 and SP Lemma C.1(a) implies [b] p′ is well-defined
and [c] p′ is surjective. Because of [b], it suffices to show that (T ′, p′) is a functioned
tree.
Toward that end, consider Lemma A.13. Lemma A.13’s assumptions are met by
[a] and the injectivity of τ . Thus Lemma A.13 implies that (T ′, p?) is a functioned
tree, where the function p? is defined by [d] p? being surjective and [e] p?gr =
{ (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr }. Thus it suffices to show that p′ = p?.
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Toward that end, note [c] and [d] imply that both p′ and p? are surjective. Thus
it suffices to show p′gr = p?gr. I argue
p′gr = { (t′], t′)∈(T ′)2 | (∃c′∈C ′)(t′, c′, t′])∈⊗′gr }
= { (t′], t′)∈(T ′)2 | (∃c′∈C ′)(∃(t, c, t])∈⊗gr) (t′, c′, t′])=(τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])) }
= { (t′], t′)∈(T ′)2 | (∃(t, c, t])∈⊗gr) (t′, t′])=(τ(t), τ(t])) }
= { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (∃c∈C)(t, c, t])∈⊗gr }
= { (τ(t]), τ(t)) | (t], t)∈pgr }
= p?gr.
The first equality holds by the definition of p′ two paragraphs ago, and the second
equality holds by the definition of ⊗′ in the lemma statement. The ⊆ direction
of the third equality holds simply because the variable c′ does not appear in the
right-hand side. The ⊇ direction follows from ⊗gr ⊆ T×C×T and δ:C→C ′. The
fourth equality holds because the codomain of τ is T ′. The fifth equality follows
from the definition of p two paragraphs ago, and the sixth equality follows from [e].
Claim 8: (∀c′∈C ′) (F ′)−1(c′) = τ(F−1(δ−1(c′))). Take c′ ∈ C ′. I argue, in
seven steps, that (F ′)−1(c′) by definition is {t′∈T ′|c′∈F ′(t′)}, which by rearrange-
ment is {t′∈T ′|(t′, c′)∈F ′gr}, which, by the definition of F ′, the bijectivity of τ , and
the bijectivity of δ, is {t′∈T ′|(τ−1(t′), δ−1(c′))∈F gr}, which by the
bijectivity of τ is {t′|(∃t∈T ) t′=τ(t), (τ−1(t′), δ−1(c′))∈F gr}, which by rearrange-
ment is {τ(t)|(∃t∈T )(τ−1◦τ(t), δ−1(c′))∈F gr}, which by rearrangement is
τ({t∈T |(t, δ−1(c′))∈F gr}, which by rearrangement is τ(F−1(δ−1(c′))).
Claim 9: [P3 ′] holds. It must be shown that
[a] (∀c′∈C ′) (F ′)−1(c′) 6= ∅,
[b] (∀c′A∈C ′, c′B∈C ′) (F ′)−1(c′A)∩(F ′)−1(c′B) 6= ∅
⇒ (F ′)−1(c′A) = (F ′)−1(c′B) , and
[c] ∪c′∈C′(F ′)−1(c′) = (F ′)−1(C ′).
To show [a], take c′. By the bijectivity of δ, δ−1(c′) ∈ C. Thus by [P3], F−1(δ−1(c′))
6= ∅. Thus τ(F−1(δ−1(c′))) 6= ∅. Thus by Claim 8, (F ′)−1(c′) 6= ∅. To show [b],
suppose that [b] were false. Then there would be c′A and c′B such that (F ′)−1(c′A)
and (F ′)−1(c′B) intersect and are unequal. Hence by Claim 8, τ(F−1(δ−1(c′A))) and
τ(F−1(δ−1(c′A))) intersect and are unequal. Hence by the bijectivity of τ ,
F−1(δ−1(c′A)) and F−1(δ−1(c′B)) intersect and are unequal. This contradicts [P3]
because both δ−1(c′A) and δ−1(c′B) belong to C by the bijectivity of δ. Finally, [c]
holds by definition (recall the last sentence of note 7).
(b). This paragraph shows that [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is a morphism. Π is a preform by
assumption and Π ′ is a preform by part (a). [PM1] and [PM2] hold by assumption
(a fortiori). [PM3] holds with equality by the definition of ⊗′.
Finally, SP Theorem 3.7 implies that [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an isomorphism because
[a] it is a morphism by the previous paragraph and [b] τ and δ are bijective by
assumption. 2
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Lemma A.15. Suppose Φ = (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) is an NCF form. Also suppose
ι:I→I ′, τ :T→T ′, and δ:∪i∈ICi→C ′ are bijections. Define ⊗′ by surjectivity and
⊗′gr = {(τ(t), δ(c), τ(t])|(t, c, t])∈⊗gr}. Also define (C ′i′)i′∈I′ at each i′ by C ′i′ =
δ(Cι−1(i′)). Also define Φ
′ = (I ′, T ′, (C ′i′)i′∈I′ ,⊗′). Then (a) Φ′ is an NCF form
and (b) [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism.
Proof. Define C = ∪i∈ICi. Define Π = (T,C,⊗). Define Π ′ = (T ′, C ′,⊗′).
Claim 1: (a) Π ′ is an NCP preform and (b) [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP isomor-
phism. Consider Lemma A.14. The assumptions of Lemma A.14 are met because
[i] Π is an NCP preform by [F1], [ii] τ :T→T ′ is a bijection by assumption, and
[iii] δ:C→C ′ is a bijection because C = ∪i∈ICi by definition and δ:∪i∈ICi→C ′ is a
bijection by assumption. Further, Lemma A.14’s definitions of ⊗′ and Π ′ coincide
with the present definitions of ⊗′ and Π ′. Thus Lemma A.14 implies this claim’s
two conclusions.
Claim 2: C ′ = ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . I argue, in four steps, that C ′ by the bijectivity of δ
equals δ(∪i∈ICi), which by rearrangement equals ∪i∈Iδ(Ci), which by the bijectivity
of ι equals ∪i′∈I′δ(Cι−1(i′)), which by the definition of (C ′i′)i′∈I′ equals ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ .
Claim 3: Φ′ satisfies [F1]. It must be shown that (T ′, C?,⊗′) is a preform where
C? is defined as ∪i′∈I′C ′i′ . Claim 2 implies that C? = C ′. Hence Π ′ = (T ′, C?,⊗′).
Hence Claim 1(a) implies that (T ′, C?,⊗′) is a preform.
Claim 4: Φ′ satisfies [F2]. Take i′ ∈ I ′ and j′ ∈ I ′r{i′}. The bijectivity of ι im-
plies ι−1(i′) ∈ I and ι−1(j′) ∈ Ir{ι−1(i′)}. Thus [F2] for Φ implies
Cι−1(i′) ∩Cι−1(j′) = ∅. Hence the bijectivity of δ implies δ(Cι−1(i′))∩ δ(Cι−1(j′)) =
∅. Hence the definition of (C ′i′)i′∈I′ implies C ′i′∩C ′j′ = ∅.
Claim 5: Φ′ satisfies [F3]. Take t′ ∈ T ′. The bijectivity of τ implies τ−1(t′) ∈ T .
Hence [F3] for Φ implies there is i ∈ I such that F (τ−1(t′)) ⊆ Ci. Hence the bijec-
tivity of ι implies there is i′ ∈ I ′ such that [a] F (τ−1(t′)) ⊆ Cι−1(i′). Also, I show
[b] F (τ−1(t′)) = δ−1(F ′(t′)) by arguing, in steps, that F (τ−1(t′)) by rearrange-
ment equals {c∈C|(τ−1(t′), c)∈F gr}, which by Claim 1(b) and SP Proposition 3.8(c)
equals {c∈C|(t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr}, which by the bijectivity of δ equals {c|(∃c′∈C ′)
c=δ−1(c′), (t′, δ(c))∈F ′gr}, which by rearrangement equals {δ−1(c′)|(∃c′∈C ′)
(t′, c′)∈F ′gr}, which by rearrangement equals δ−1({c′∈C ′|(t′, c′)∈F ′gr}), which by
rearrangement equals δ−1(F ′(t′)). [a] and [b] imply δ−1(F ′(t′)) ⊆ Cι−1(i′). Hence
the bijectivity of δ implies F ′(t′) ⊆ δ(Cι−1(i′)). Hence the definition of C ′i′ implies
F ′(t′) ⊆ C ′i′ .
Claim 6: Φ′ is an NCF form. This follows from Claims 3–5.
Claim 7: [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism. Φ is an NCF form by assumption,
and Φ′ is an NCF form by Claim 6. [FM1] holds because [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP
morphism a fortiori by Claim 1(b). [FM2] holds by assumption. For [FM3], take
i ∈ I. I argue, in two steps, that δ(Ci) by the bijectivity of ι equals δ(Cι−1◦ι(i)),
which by definition of C ′ι(i) equals C
′
ι(i).
Claim 8: [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism. This follows from the reverse
direction of Corollary 2.5 because [a] [Φ,Φ′, ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism by Claim 7,
[b] [Π,Π ′, τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism by Claim 1(b), and [c] ι is a bijection by
assumption.
Conclusion. The lemma’s conclusions follow from Claims 6 and 8. 2
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Appendix B. CsqF
Proof B.1 (for Proposition 3.1). The
i B. CsqF
proposition follows from Claims 1–8 and
13–14.
Claim 1: (a) holds. Suppose [a] to 6= {}. [Csq1] states [b] {} ∈ T . [a] and [b] im-
ply {} ∈ Tr{to}. Thus by [P1], there are t ∈ T and c ∈ C such that (t, c, {}) ∈ ⊗gr.
Thus by [Csq2], p({})⊕(c) = {}. This is impossible because the left-hand sequence
has positive length and the right-hand sequence has zero length.
Claim 2: (b) holds. Take t] ∈ Tr{{}}. Claim 1 (a) implies t] ∈ Tr{to}. Thus
the reverse direction of SP Proposition 3.1(a) implies (p(t]), q(t]), t]) ∈ ⊗. Thus
[Csq2] implies p(t])⊕(q(t])) = t]. Thus p(t]) = 1t]|t]|−1 and q(t]) = t]|t]|.
Claim 3: (c) holds. Assume (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. Then [P1] yields (t, c, t]) ∈ T×C×T ,
and [Csq2] yields t⊕(c) = t]. Conversely, suppose [1] (t, c, t]) ∈ T×C×T and
[2] t⊕(c) = t]. [2] implies [3] t = 1t]|t]|−1 and [4] c = t]|t]|. Further, [4] im-
plies t] 6= {}. This and [1] implies [5] t] ∈ Tr{{}}. [5] and Claim 2 (b) imply
[6] p(t]) = 1t
]
|t]|−1 and [7] q(t
]) = t]|t]|. [3] and [6] imply [8] t = p(t
]). [4] and
[7] imply [9] c = q(t]). Further, [5] and Claim 1 (a) imply t] 6= to, and thus SP
Proposition 3.1(a) implies [10] (p(t]), q(t]), t]) ∈ ⊗gr. [8]–[10] imply (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr.
Claim 4: (d) holds. By [P1], F ⊆ T×C. Thus it suffices to show (∀t∈T, c∈C)
(t, c) ∈ F gr iff t⊕c ∈ T . Suppose (t, c) ∈ F gr. Then [P1] implies there is [1] t] ∈ T
such that [2] (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. [2] and Claim 3 (c) imply t⊕(c) = t]. This and
[1] imply t⊕(c) ∈ T . Conversely, suppose t⊕(c) ∈ T . There there is t] ∈ T such
that t⊕(c) = t]. Thus Claim 3 (c) implies (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. This and [P1] imply
(t, c) ∈ F gr.
Claim 5: (e) holds. Take t ∈ T . I will use induction on m ∈ {0, 1, ... |t|}. For the
initial step, assume m = 0. Then p0(t) = t = 1t|t| = 1t|t|−0 = 1t|t|−m by inspection.
For the inductive step, assume m > 0. Note m ≤ |t| implies |t|−m ≥ 0, which
implies |t|−(m−1) > 0, which implies [1] 1t|t|−(m−1) 6= {}. I then argue, in steps,
that pm(t) by m > 0 equals p(pm−1(t)), which by the inductive hypothesis equals
p(1t|t|−(m−1)), which by [1] and Claim 2 (b) at t] = 1t|t|−(m−1) equals 1t|t|−(m−1)−1,
which by rearrangement equals 1t|t|−m.
Claim 6: (f) holds. Take t ∈ T . I show p|t|(t) = t0 by arguing, in steps, that
p|t|(t) by Claim 5 (e) at m = |t| equals 1t|t|−|t|, which equals 1t0, which equals {},
which by Claim 1 (a) equals to. This and the definition of k imply k(t) = |t|.
Claim 7: (g) holds. Take t ∈ T . By inspection, the result is equivalent to
(∀`∈{1, 2, ... |t|}) t` = q◦p|t|−`(t). On the one hand, take t = {}. Then |t| = 0
so the result is vacuously true. On the other hand, take t 6= {}. Then take
[1] ` ∈ {1, 2, ... |t|}. First I show [2] p|t|−`(t) = 1t` by arguing, in steps, that
p|t|−`(t) by Claim 5 (e) at m = |t|−` equals 1t|t|−(|t|−`), which by rearrangement
equals 1t`. Then I argue, in steps, that q◦p|t|−`(t) by [2] equals q(1t`), which by [1]
and Claim 2 (b) equals t`.
Claim 8: (h) holds. Suppose c ∈ C. This and [P3] imply F−1(c) 6= ∅. Thus
there is t? ∈ T such that (t?, c) ∈ F gr. This and Claim 4 (d) imply t∗⊕(c) ∈ T .
Thus c ∈ R(t∗⊕(c)) ⊆ ∪{R(t)|t∈T}. Conversely, suppose b ∈ ∪{R(t)|t∈T}. There
there is [1] t∗ ∈ T such that [2] b ∈ R(t∗). [1] and Claim 7 (g) imply that t∗ =
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(q◦p|t∗|−`(t∗))|t∗|`=1. This and [2] imply there is `∗ ∈ {1, 2, ... |t∗|} such that b =
q◦p|t∗|−`∗(t∗). This implies b ∈ C since the codomain of q is C by the definition of
q.
Claim 9: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) (|tA|< |tB | and tA = 1tB|tA|) iff tA ⊂ tB . Take tA ∈ T
and tB ∈ T . First, suppose [1] |tA| < |tB | and [2] tA = 1tB|tA|. [1] and the definition
of 1t
B
|tA| imply [3] 1t
B
|tA| ⊂ tB . [2] and [3] imply tA ⊂ tB . Conversely, suppose
[4] tA ⊂ tB . [Csq1] implies [5] tA = {(1, tA1 ), (2, tA2 ), ... (|tA|, tA|tA|)} and [6] tB =
{(1, tB1 ), (2, tB2 ), ... (|tB |, tB|tB |)}. By inspection, [4]–[6] imply |tA| < |tB | and tA =
1t
B
|tA|.
Claim 10: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) (|tA| ≤ |tB | and tA = 1tB|tA|) iff tA ⊆ tB .27 In the proof
of Claim 7719o, change < to ≤, and ⊂ to ⊆.
Claim 11: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ≺ tB iff tA ⊂ tB . Take tA ∈ T and tB ∈ T . First,
suppose tA ≺ tB . This and the definition of ≺ imply there is [1] m ∈ {1, 2, ... k(tB)}
such that [2] tA = pm(tB). [1] and Claim 6 (f) imply [3] m ∈ {1, 2, ... |tB |}. Finally,
I argue, in steps, that tA by [2] equals pm(tB), which by [3] and Claim 5 (e) equals
1t
B
|tB |−m, which by [3] is a strict subset of 1t
B
|tB |, which by inspection equals t
B .
Conversely, suppose tA ⊂ tB . This and Claim 7719o imply [1] |tA| < |tB | and
[2] tA = 1t
B
|tA|. For convenience, let [3] m = |tB |−|tA|. Note [1] and |tA| ≥ 0 imply
[4] m ∈ {1, 2, ... |tB |}. I now show [5] tA = pm(tB) by arguing, in steps, that tA
by [2] equals 1t
B
|tA|, which by [3] equals 1t
B
|tB |−m, which by [4] and Claim 5 (e) at
t = tB equals pm(tB). Finally, [5], [4], and the definition of ≺ imply tA ≺ tB .
Claim 12: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA 4 tB iff tA ⊆ tB . Take tA ∈ T and tB ∈ T . First,
suppose tA 4 tB . Then by the definition of 4, either tA ≺ tB or tA = tB . In the
first case, Claim 7724o implies tA ⊂ tB . Thus tA ⊆ tB in both cases. Conversely,
suppose tA ⊆ tB . Then either tA ⊂ tB or tA = tB . In the first case, Claim 11
implies tA ≺ tB . Thus the definition of 4 implies tA 4 tB in both cases.
Claim 13: (i) holds. Combine Claims 9 and 11.
Claim 14: (j) holds. Combine Claims 10 and 12. 2
Lemma B.2. Suppose (T,C,⊗) is a node-and-choice preform with its to, p, and
q. Let T¯ = { (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1 | t∈T }. Then
T 3 t 7→ (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1 ∈ T¯
is a well-defined bijection. Its inverse is
T 3 ((...((to⊗t¯1)⊗t¯2) . . . )⊗t¯|t¯|−1)⊗t¯|t¯| 7 →¯t ∈ T¯
(to be clear, T 3 to 7 →{} ∈ T¯ ).
Proof. Let α be the function from T to T¯ , and conversely, let β be the function
to T from T¯ .
This paragraph shows that β◦α is the identity function on T . The composition
is well-defined because [1] the domain of β is T¯ and [2] the range of α is T¯ by the
27Claim 10 says that one sequence is an initial segment of another sequence iff the former is
a restriction of the latter. This may appear implausible. For example, {(2, f)} is not an initial
sequence of t∗ = {(1, g), (2, f), (3, f)} even though {(2, f)} is a restriction of t∗. This is consistent
with Claim 10, because {(2, f)} is not a sequence and thus not an element of T by [Csq1].
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definition of T¯ . Thus it suffices to show (∀t∈T ) β◦α(t) = t. Toward that end, take
t ∈ T . First, suppose k(t) = 0. I argue, in steps, that β◦α(t) by the definition of
α equals β({}), which by the definition of β equals to, which by k(t) = 0 equals t.
Second, suppose k(t) = 1. I argue, in steps, that β◦α(t) by the definition of α equals
β[(q(t))], which by the definition of β equals to⊗q(t), which by k(t) = 1 equals
p(t)⊗q(t), which by SP Proposition 3.1(b) equals t. Third and finally, suppose
k(t) ≥ 2. I will argue
β◦α(t) = β( (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1 )
= [[...[[to⊗q◦pk(t)−1(t)]⊗q◦pk(t)−2(t)] ... ]⊗q◦p(t)]⊗q(t)
= [[...[[pk(t)(t)⊗q◦pk(t)−1(t)]⊗q◦pk(t)−2(t)] ... ]⊗q◦p(t)]⊗q(t)
= [[...[[p◦pk(t)−1(t)⊗q◦pk(t)−1(t)]⊗q◦pk(t)−2(t)] ... ]⊗q◦p(t)]⊗q(t)
= [[...[pk(t)−1(t)⊗q◦pk(t)−2] ... ]⊗q◦p(t)]⊗q(t)
· · ·
= p(t)⊗q(t) = t.
The first equality holds by the definition of α, the second by the definition of
β, and the third by the definition of k. The fourth and fifth equalities hold by
a rearrangement and SP Proposition 3.1(b). The sixth equality holds by k(t)−2
similar applications of SP Proposition 3.1(b), and the final equality holds by a final
application of SP Proposition 3.1(b).
This paragraph shows that α◦β is the identity function on T¯ . The composition is
well-defined because [a] the domain of α is T and [b] each value of β is a value of ⊗
and the codomain of ⊗ is a subset of T . Thus it suffices to show (∀t¯∈T¯ ) α◦β(t¯) = t¯.
Toward that end, take t¯. First, suppose t¯ = {}. I argue, in steps, that α◦β({})
by the definition of β equals α(to), which by the definition of α equals {}. Second,
suppose t¯ 6= {}. Then it suffices to show that (∀t¯∈T¯ ) (∀`∈{1, 2, ...|t¯|}) (α◦β(t¯))` =
t¯`. Toward this end, take t¯ and `. [i] First assume ` < |t¯|. I will argue
(α◦β(t¯))` = q◦pk(β(t¯))−`(β(t¯))
= q◦p|t¯|−`(β(t¯))
= q◦p|t¯|−`[ ((...((to⊗t¯1)⊗t¯2) . . . )⊗t¯|t¯|−1)⊗t¯|t¯| ]
= q◦p|t¯|−`−1[ ((...((to⊗t¯1)⊗t¯2) . . . )⊗t¯|t¯|−2)⊗t¯|t¯|−1 ]
· · ·
= q◦p|t¯|−`−(|t¯|−`)[ ((...((to⊗t¯1)⊗t¯2) . . . )⊗t¯|t¯|−(|t¯|−`)−1)⊗t¯|t¯|−(|t¯|−`) ]
= q◦p0[ ((...((to⊗t¯1)⊗t¯2) . . . )⊗t¯`−1)⊗t¯` ] = t¯`.
The first equality holds by the definition of α. The second equality holds because
k(β(t¯)) = |t¯| by inspecting the definitions of k and β. The third holds by the
definition of β. The fourth holds by the definition of p. The fifth holds by |t|−`−1
similar applications of the definition of p. The sixth is a rearrangement. The
seventh holds by the definition of q. [ii] Second assume ` = |t¯|. Then I will argue
(α◦β(t¯))|t¯| = q◦pk(β(t¯))−|t¯|(β(t¯))
= q◦p|t¯|−|t¯|(β(t¯)) = q(β(t¯)) = t¯|t¯| ,
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The first equality holds by the definition of α and ` = |t¯|. The second equality
holds because k(β(t¯)) = |t¯| by inspecting the definitions of k and β. The third is
trivial. The fourth holds by the definitions of q and β. 2
Proof B.3 (for Theorem 3.2). (a). Lemma B.2 implies τ¯ :T→T¯ is a bijec-
tion. Thus the assumptions of Lemma A.14 are met at T ′ = T¯ , C ′ = C, and
δ = idC . Further, the definition of ⊗¯ here coincides with the definition of ⊗′ in
Lemma A.14. Therefore Lemma A.14 implies that (T¯, C, ⊗¯) is an NCP preform,
and that [(T,C,⊗), (T¯, C, ⊗¯), τ¯, idC ] is an NCP isomorphism. Thus [Csq1] and
[Csq2] remain to be shown.
For [Csq1], note that the definition of T¯ implies that T¯ is a collection of finite se-
quences. Further, since to ∈ T by [P1], the definition of T¯ implies
that (q◦pk(to)−`(to))k(to)`=1 ∈ T¯ . Thus, since k(to) = 0 by the definition of k,
(q◦p0−`(to))0`=1 ∈ T¯ . Thus {} ∈ T¯ .
For [Csq2], take (t¯, c, t¯]) ∈ ⊗¯. Then by the definition of ⊗¯, there are t ∈ T and
t] ∈ T such that [a] τ¯(t) = t¯, [b] τ¯(t]) = t¯], and [c] (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. [a], [b], and the
definition of τ¯ imply [d] t¯ = (q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1 and [e] t¯] = (q◦pk(t
])−`(t]))k(t
])
`=1 . Also
[c] and SP Proposition 3.1(b) imply [f] t = p(t]) and [g] c = q(t]). [f] and the defini-
tion of k imply [h] k(t) = k(t])−1. Finally, I argue, in steps, that t¯⊕(c) by [d] equals
(q◦pk(t)−`(t))k(t)`=1⊕(c), which by [f]–[h] equals (q◦pk(t
])−1−`◦p(t]))k(t])−1`=1 ⊕(q(t])),
which by rearrangement equals (q◦pk(t])−`(t]))k(t])−1`=1 ⊕(q(t])), which by rearrange-
ment equals (q◦pk(t])−`(p(t]))k(t])`=1 , which by [e] equals t¯].
(b). By assumption, (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) is an NCF form. Thus [F1] implies
(T,∪i∈ICi,⊗) is an NCP preform. Further, part (b) defines T¯ , τ¯ , and ⊗¯ as part
(a) did. Thus part (a) implies [1] (T¯,∪i∈ICi, ⊗¯) is a CsqP preform.
Meanwhile, Lemma B.2 implies τ¯ :T→T¯ is a bijection. Thus the assumptions of
Lemma A.15 are met at I ′ = I, ι = idI , T ′ = T¯ , C ′ = ∪i∈ICi, and δ = id∪i∈ICi .
Further, the definition of ⊗¯ here coincides with the definition of ⊗′ in Lemma A.15.
Also, the transparent definitions of ι and δ here, and the definition of (C ′i′)i′∈I′
in Lemma A.15, imply that (C ′i′)i′∈I′ = (Ci)i∈I . Hence Lemma A.15 implies that
[1] (I, T¯, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗¯) is an NCF form, and [2] [(I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗), (I, T¯, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗¯),
idI , τ¯, id∪i∈ICi ] is an NCF isomorphism.
[1] and [1] imply that (I, T¯, (Ci)i∈I , ⊗¯) is a CsqF form. This and [2] are part
(b)’s conclusions. 2
Lemma B.4. Suppose (T,C,⊗) is a CsqP preform. Then the following are
equivalent.
(a) (T,C,⊗) has no absentmindedness.
(b) (/∃H∈H, t∈H, `<|t|) 1t` ∈ H.
(c) (∀t∈T,H∈H) |{ ` : 1≤`≤|t|, t`∈F (H) }| ≤ 1.28
(d) (∀t∈T ) |R(t)| = |t|.
(e) R|T is injective.
Proof. The lemma follows from Claims 5–7.
Claim 1: Not (a) ⇒ not (b). Assume absentmindedness. Then there are
[a] H ∈ H, [b] t ∈ H, and [c] s ∈ H such that [d] s ≺ t. [d] and Proposition
28The “ : ” replaces “ | ” for clarity.
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3.1(i) imply [e] |s| < |t| and [f] s = 1t|s|. [f] and [c] imply [g] 1t|s| ∈ H. [a], [b], [e],
and [g] show property (b) is violated at ` = |s|.
Claim 2: Not (b) ⇒ not (c). Assume not (b). Then there is H ∈ H, [a] t ∈ H,
and [b] ` < |t| such that [c] 1t` ∈ H. [b] implies t`+1 is well-defined; thus the
definition of F implies t`+1 ∈ F (1t`); and thus [c] implies [d] t`+1 ∈ F (H). [d] and
[a] imply t`+1 ∈ F (t); and thus t∗ = t⊕(t`+1) is a member of T . Finally, I argue,
in steps, that |{`′:1≤`′≤|t∗|, t∗`′∈F (H)}| by [d] is at least |{`′:1≤`′≤|t∗|, t∗`′=t`+1}|,
which by the construction of t∗ is at least |{`+1, |t|+1}|, which by [b] is 2.
Claim 3: Not (c) ⇒ not (d). Assume not (c). There there are t ∈ T and H ∈ H
such that |{`:1≤`≤|t|, t`∈F (H)}| ≥ 2. Hence there are ` and `′ such that [a] ` < `′,
[b] t` ∈ F (H), and [c] t`′ ∈ F (H). I argue in three steps that [c] by Proposi-
tion 3.1(b) implies q(1t`′) ∈ F (H), which by Proposition A.1(c) implies p(1t`′) ∈ H,
which by Proposition 3.1(b) implies [d] 1t`′−1 ∈ H. [b] and [d] imply t` ∈ F (1tt′−1).
Thus t∗ = 1t`′−1⊕(t`) is a member of T . Further, [a] implies t∗` is well-defined and
equal to t`. Thus t
∗
` = t
∗
`′ . This and [a] again imply |R(t∗)| < |t∗|.
Claim 4: Not (d) ⇒ not (a). Assume not (d). There there is t ∈ T such that
|R(t)| 6= |t|. Since |R(t)| > |t| is inconceivable, |R(t)| < |t|. Thus there are ` and
`′ in {1, 2, ... |t|} such that [a] ` < `′ and [b] t` = t`′ . The definition of F implies
[c] 1t`−1 ∈ F−1(t`) and [d] 1t`′−1 ∈ F−1(t`′). [b] and [d] imply [e] 1t`′−1 ∈ F−1(t`).
[P3] implies [f] F−1(t`) ∈ H. Finally, [a] implies `−1 < `′−1; thus Proposition 3.1(i)
implies [g] 1t`−1 ≺ 1t`′−1. [f], [c], [e], and [g] imply absentmindedness.
Claim 5: (a), (b), (c), and (d) are equivalent. This follows from Claims 1–4.
Claim 6: Not (d) ⇒ not (e). Assume not (d). Then there is t ∈ T such that
|R(t)| 6= |t|. Thus since |R(t)| > |t| is inconceivable, |R(t)| < |t|. Thus there are
` and `′ in {1, 2, ... |t|} such that [a] ` < `′ and [b] t` = t`′ . [a] and [b] imply
R(1t`′−1) = R(1t`′). Thus R|T is not injective.
Claim 7: Not (e) ⇒ not (d). Assume not (e). Then R|T is not injective. Then
there are s and t in T such that [a] s 6= t and [b] R(s) = R(t).
On the one hand, suppose there is not an ` in {1, 2, ...min{|s|, |t|}} such that
s` 6= t`. Then [c] 1smax{|s|,|t|} = 1tmax{|s|,|t|}. Thus [a] implies |s| 6= |t|. Hence
|s| < |t| or |t| < |s|. Without loss of generality assume [d] |s| < |t|. Hence [c]
implies [e] s = 1t|s|. [d] implies t|s|+1 exists. Thus [b] implies s 6= {} and there is
[f] ` ∈ {1, 2, ... |s|} such that [g] s` = t|s|+1. But [e] implies s` = t`, and thus [g]
implies t` = t|s|+1. This and [f] imply |R(t)| < |t|. In other words, property (d) is
violated.
On the other hand, suppose there is an ` in {1, 2, ...min{|s|, |t|}} such that
s` 6= t`. Let j be the smallest such `. Then [h] 1sj−1 = 1tj−1 and [i] sj 6= tj .
The definition of F implies sj ∈ F (1sj−1) and tj ∈ F (1tj−1), and thus, [h] implies
[j] {sj , tj} ⊆ F (1sj−1). A fortiori [j] and [P3] imply there is H ∈ H such that
1sj−1 ∈ H. Hence [j] also implies [k] {sj , tj} ⊆ F (H). Further, [b] and [i] imply
there is j∗ ∈ {1, 2, ... |s|} such that [l] j∗ 6= j and [m] sj∗ = tj . [m] and [k] imply
[n] {sj , sj∗} ⊆ F (H). Finally, I argue that |{ ` : 1≤`≤|s|, s`∈F (H) }| is at least as
great as |{j, j∗}| by [n], which is 2 by [l]. Thus the proposition’s property (c) is
violated. So Claim 5((c)⇔(d)) implies property (d) is violated. 2
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Lemma C.1. Suppose C is a set, t⊆C, c∈C, and t]⊆C. Then the following
are equivalent. (a) c /∈ t and t∪{c}= t]. (b) t 6= t] and t∪{c}= t]. (c) t 6= t] and
t= t]r{c}. (d) t⊆ t] and {c}= t]rt.
Proof. (a)⇔(b). It suffices to show that if t∪{c} = t], then c /∈ t and t 6= t]
are equivalent. Toward that end, assume t∪{c} = t]. Then both directions of the
equivalence hold by inspection.
(b)⇔(c). It suffices to show that if t 6= t], then t∪{c} = t] and t = t]r{c} are
equivalent. Toward that end, assume [1] t 6= t]. For the forward direction, assume
[2] t∪{c} = t]. [1], [2] imply [3] c /∈ t. [2] implies (t∪{c})r{c} = t]r{c}, and [3]
implies the left-hand side is t. For the reverse direction, assume [4] t = t]r{c}.
[1] and [4] imply [5] c ∈ t]. [4] implies t∪{c} = (t]r{c})∪{c}, and [5] implies the
right-hand side is t].
(a)⇔(d). Assume (a). That is, assume [a] c /∈ t and [b] t∪{c} = t]. [b] implies
t ⊆ t]. Further, [b] implies (t∪{c})rt = t]rt, and [a] implies that the left-hand side
is {c}. Conversely, assume (d). That is, assume [c] t ⊆ t] and [d] {c} = t]rt. [d]
implies c /∈ t. Further, [d] implies t∪{c} = t∪(t]rt), and [c] implies the right-hand
side is t]. 2
Proof C.2 (for Proposition 4.1). The proposition if proved by Claims 1, 3, 5,
6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, and 19.
Claim 1: (a) holds. Suppose [a] to 6= {}. [Cset1] states [b] {} ∈ T . [a] and [b] im-
ply {} ∈ Tr{to}. Thus by [P1], there is t ∈ T and c ∈ C such that (t, c, {}) ∈ ⊗gr.
Thus by [Cset2], t∪{c} = {}. This implies c ∈ {}, which is impossible.
Claim 2: ⊗ ⊆ { (t, c, t])∈T×C×T | c/∈t, t∪{c}=t] }. Take (t, c, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. [P1]
yields [a] (t, c, t]) ∈ T×C×T . [P2] yields [b] t = p(t]). Remark [ii] in the paragraph
following SP equation (1) yields [c] p(t]) 6= t]. [b] and [c] imply [d] t 6= t]. [Cset2]
yields [e] t∪{c}=t]. [d] and [e] yield [f] c /∈ t. [a], [f], and [e] are the desired results.
Claim 3: (b) holds. Take t] ∈ Tr{{}}. Claim 1 (a) implies that t] ∈ Tr{to}.
Thus SP Proposition 3.1(a) implies that (p(t]), q(t]), t]) ∈ ⊗. Thus Claim 2 implies
that q(t]) /∈ p(t]) and p(t])∪{q(t])} = t].
Claim 4: (∀t∈T, ∀m∈{0, 1, 2, ... k(t)}) |pm(t)| = |t| −m. Note by inspection,
that Claim 3 (b) implies [a] (∀t]∈Tr{{}}) |p(t])| = |t]|−1. To prove the present
claim, take t ∈ T . I will show (∀m∈{0, 1, 2, ... k(t)}) |pm(t)| = |t| −m by induction.
For the initial step (m=0), |p0(t)| = |t| = |t|−0 = |t|−m by inspection. For the
inductive step (m≥1), I first note that by assumption m ≤ k(t), which trivially im-
plies m−1 < k(t), which by the definition of k implies pm−1(t) 6= to, which by Claim
1 (a) implies [b] pm−1(t) 6= {}. I then argue, in steps, that |pm(t)| by rearrangement
equals |p◦pm−1(t)|, which by [b] and [a] at t] = pm−1(t) equals |pm−1(t)|−1, which
by the inductive hypothesis equals (|t|−(m−1))−1, which by rearrangement equals
|t| −m.
Claim 5: (c) holds. Take t ∈ T . Note [a] |pk(t)(t)| = |t| − k(t) by Claim 4 at
m= k(t). Also note [b] |pk(t)(t)| = |to| = |{}| = 0 by the definition of k(t) and by
Claim 1 (a). [a] and [b] imply |t| − k(t) = 0. Hence |t| = k(t).
Claim 6: (d) holds. Take t ∈ T . I will use induction on m ∈ {0, 1, ... |t|}. For
the initial step (m=0), pm(t) = p0(t) = t and trpm(t) = trp0(t) = trt = {} =
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{ q◦pn(t) | 0>n≥0 } = { q◦pn(t) |m>n≥0 }. For the inductive step (m≥1), note
m ≤ |t| by assumption; which implies m−1 < |t|; which implies m−1 < k(t)
by Claim 5 (c); which implies pm−1(t) 6= to by the definition of k; which im-
plies pm−1(t) 6= {} by Claim 1 (a). Hence, Claim 3 (b) at t] = pm−1(t) implies
q◦pm−1(t) /∈ p◦pm−1(t) and p◦pm−1(t)∪{q◦pm−1(t)} = pm−1(t). By
Lemma C.1(a)⇔(d), this is equivalent to p◦pm−1(t) ⊆ pm−1(t) and
pm−1(t)rp◦pm−1(t) = {q◦pm−1(t)}. By a small rearrangement, this is equivalent
to [c] pm(t) ⊆ pm−1(t) and [d] pm−1(t)rpm(t) = {q◦pm−1(t)}. Meanwhile, the in-
ductive hypothesis is [e] pm−1(t) ⊆ t and [f] trpm−1(t) = { q◦pn(t) |m−1>n≥0 }. [c]
and [e] imply [g] pm(t) ⊆ t. [c] and [e] also imply [h] trpm(t) =
(trpm−1(t)) ∪ (pm−1(t)rpm(t)). [h], [f], and [d] imply [i] trpm(t) =
{ q◦pn(t) |m−1>n≥0 } ∪ {q◦pm−1(t)}. The right-hand side of [i] is equal to
{ q◦pn(t) |m−1≥n≥0 }, which is equal to { q◦pn(t) |m>n≥0 }. Hence [i] is equiva-
lent to [j] trpm(t) = { q◦pn(t) |m>n≥0 }. [g] and [j] are the desired results.
Claim 7: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ≺ tB ⇒ tA ⊂ tB . Suppose tA ≺ tB . Then the defi-
nitions of ≺ and k imply there is [a] m ∈ {1, 2, ... k(tB)} such that [b] tA = pm(tB).
[a] and Claim 5 (c) imply m ∈ {1, 2, ... |tB |}. Thus Claim 6 (d) at t = tB implies
[c] pm(tB) ⊆ tB and [d] tBrpm(tB) = { q◦pn(tB) |m>n≥0 }. Since m ≥ 1 by [a],
{ q◦pn(tB) |m>n≥0 } is nonempty. Thus [c] and [d] imply pm(tB) ⊂ tB . Thus [b]
implies tA ⊂ tB .
Claim 8: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA 4 tB ⇒ tA ⊆ tB . Suppose tA 4 tB . Then the defi-
nition of 4 implies tA ≺ tB or tA = tB . The first implies tA ⊆ tB by Claim 7. The
second implies tA ⊆ tB trivially.
Claim 9: (e) holds. Take t ∈ T . I argue, in steps, that t trivially equals tr{},
which by Claim 1 (a) equals trto, which by the definition of k equals trpk(t)(t),
which by Claim 5 (c) equals trp|t|(t), which by Claim 6 (d) at m = |t| equals
{ q◦pn(t) | |t|>n≥0 }
Claim 10: (f) holds. Forward direction. Take c ∈ C. By [P3], F−1(c) is a
member of a partition, and thus, it is nonempty. Take t∗ ∈ F−1(c). By [P1],
t∗⊗c ∈ T . Thus by [Cset2], t∗∪{c} ∈ T . Thus c belongs to an element of T .
Reverse direction. Take any t. [Cset1] implies that t is a set. Take b ∈ t. By Claim
9 (e), there is n such that b = q◦pn(t). Thus, since the codomain of q is C, b ∈ C.
Claim 11: (g) holds. Suppose there were H ∈ H, [a] tA ∈ H, and [b] tB ∈ H
such that [c] tA ≺ tB . [c] and the definition of ≺ imply there is [d] m > 1 such that
[e] tA = pm(tB). [d] and [e] imply tA = p◦pm−1(tB). Thus [P2]’s definition of p
implies there is c ∈ C such that [f] (tA, c, pm−1(tB)) ∈ ⊗gr. Thus the definition of
F implies c ∈ F (tA). This, [a], [b], and SP Proposition 3.2(16a) imply c ∈ F (tB).
Thus the definition of F implies there is t? ∈ T such that (tB , c, t?) ∈ ⊗gr. This and
Claim 2 implies [g] c /∈ tB . But, [f] and Claim 2 imply [h] c ∈ pm−1(tB). And, the
definition of 4 implies pm−1(tB) 4 tB , and thus Claim 8 implies [i] pm−1(tB) ⊆ tB .
[h] and [i] imply c ∈ tB , which contradicts [g].
Claim 12: (h) holds. Suppose |t∩F (H)| ≥ 2. Then by Claim 9 (e), there exist
distinctm′ andm such that { q◦pm′(t), q◦pm(t) } ⊆ F (H). Thus by Lemma A.1(c),
[a] { pm′+1(t), pm+1(t) } ⊆ H. Without loss of generality assume m′ > m. Then
pm
′+1(t) = pm
′−m◦pm+1(t). Hence [b] pm′+1(t) ≺ pm+1(t) by the definition of ≺.
[a] and [b] show there is absentmindedness, which contradicts Claim 11 (g).
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Claim 13: (∀tA∈T, tB∈T ) tA ⊂ tB implies (∀m∈{0, 1, ... |tA|}) pm(tA) =
pm+|t
B |−|tA|(tB). Suppose [1] tA ⊂ tB . I will use induction on m.
For the initial step, assume [2] m = |tA|. I argue, in steps, that pm(tA) by [2]
equals p|t
A|(tA), which by Claim 5 (c) equals pk(t
A)(tA), which by the definition of
k equals to, which by the definition of k again equals pk(t
B)(tB), which by Claim 5
(c) again equals p|t
B |(tB), which by manipulation equals p|t
A|+|tB |−|tA|(tB), which
by [2] again equals pm+|t
B |−|tA|(tB).
For the inductive step, assume [3] m < |tA|. (The next two sentences concern
pm(tA) alone.) [3] and Claim 5 (c) imply m < k(tA), which by the definition of k
implies pm(tA) 6= to. This and SP Proposition 3.1(a) at t] = pm(tA) yield
[4] pm+1(tA) ⊗ q◦pm(tA) = pm(tA).
(The next three sentences concern pm+|t
B |−|tA|(tB) alone.) [3] and manipula-
tion imply m+|tB |−|tA| < |tA|+|tB |−|tA| = |tB |, which by Claim 5 (c) implies
m+|tB |−|tA| < k(tB), which by the definition of k implies pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB) 6= to.
This and SP Proposition 3.1(a) at t] = pm+|t
B |−|tA|(tB) yield
[5] pm+1+|t
B |−|tA|(tB) ⊗ q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB) = pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB).
Since the inductive hypothesis is pm+1(tA) = pm+1+|t
B |−|tA|(tB), [5] yields
[6] pm+1(tA) ⊗ q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB) = pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB).
[4], [6], and the definition of F yield [7] { q◦pm(tA), q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB) } ⊆
F (pm+1(tA)). Also, Claim 9 (e) and [1] yield [8] q◦pm(tA) ∈ tA ⊆ tB . Also,
Claim 9 (e) yields [9] q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB) ∈ tB . [7], [8], [9], and Claim 12 (h) imply
[10] q◦pm(tA) = q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB).
Finally, I argue, in steps, that pm(tA) by [4] equals pm+1(tA)⊗q◦pm(tA), which
by [10] equals pm+1(tA) ⊗ q◦pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB), which by [6] equals pm+|tB |−|tA|(tB).
Claim 14: (i) holds. This follows from Claim 13 at m = 0.
Claim 15: (j) holds. Because of Claim 7, it suffices to show the reverse di-
rection. Toward that end, suppose [1] tA ⊂ tB . [1] and Claim 14 (i) imply
tA = p|t
B |−|tA|(tB). Further, [1] and [Cset1] imply |tB |−|tA| > 0. The last two
sentences and the definition of ≺ imply tA ≺ tB .
Claim 16: (k) holds. Because of Claim 8, it suffices to show the reverse direction.
Toward that end, suppose tA ⊆ tB . Then either tA ⊂ tB or tA = tB . In the first
case, Claim 15 (j) implies tA 4 tB . In the second case, tA 4 tB holds trivially by
the definition of 4.
Claim 17: (∀t∈T, c∈C, t]∈T ) (c /∈ t and t∪{c}= t]) ⇒ (t, c) = (p(t]), q(t])). Sup-
pose [a] c /∈ t and [b] t∪{c} = t]. [a] and [b] imply [c] t ⊂ t] and [d] |t]|−|t| = 1.
[c] and Claim 14 (i) at (tA, tB) = (t, t]) imply t = p|t
]|−|t|(t]). This and [d] imply
[e] t = p(t]). Further, [c] implies [f] t] 6= {}. I then argue, in steps, that {c} by
[a]–[b] equals t]rt, which by [e] equals t]rp(t]), which by [f] and Claim 3 (b) equals
{q(t])}. Thus [g] c = q(t]). [e] and [g] are the required results.
Claim 18: (l) holds. By Claim 2, it suffices to show the reverse direction. Toward
that end, suppose [a] c /∈ t and [b] t∪{c} = t]. [b] implies t] 6= {}. Thus Claim 1
(a) implies t] 6= to. Thus SP Proposition 3.1(a) implies [c] p(t])⊗q(t]) = t]. Also,
[a], [b], and Claim 17 imply [d] (t, c) = (p(t]), q(t])). [c] and [d] imply t⊗c = t].
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Claim 19: (m) holds. I argue, in three steps, that (t, c) ∈ F gr by [P1] is equiv-
alent to [a] (t, c)∈T×C and [b] (∃t]∈T ) (t, c, t])∈⊗gr, which by Claim 18 (l) is
equivalent to [a] and [b′] (∃t]∈T ) c /∈ t and t∪{c}= t], which by rearrangement is
equivalent to [a] and [b′′] c /∈ t and t∪{c}∈T . 2
Proof C.3 (for Theorem 4.2). (a). Lemma B.4[(a)⇒(e)] implies R|T¯ :T¯→T
is a bijection. Thus the assumptions of Lemma A.14 are met at [1] its (T,C,⊗)
equal to (T¯, C¯, ⊗¯) here, [2] its τ :T→T ′ equal to R|T¯ :T¯→T here, and [3] its δ:C→C ′
equal to idC¯ :C¯→C¯ here. Further, the definition of ⊗′ in the lemma coincides with
the definition of ⊗ here. Therefore the lemma implies that (T, C¯,⊗) is an NCP
preform, and that [(T¯, C¯, ⊗¯), (T, C¯,⊗), R|T¯ , idC¯ ] is an NCP isomorphism. Thus it
remains to show that (T, C¯,⊗) is a CsetP preform. By definition, it suffices to
show [Cset1] and [Cset2].
For [Cset1], first note that T¯ is a collection of (finite) sequences by assumption.
Hence T is a collection of finite sets by the definitions of T and R. Further, {}
belongs to T¯ by [Csq1]. Hence R({}) = {} belongs to T .
For [Cset2], take (t, c¯, t]) ∈ ⊗gr. Then by the definition of ⊗, there are t¯ ∈ T¯
and t¯] ∈ T¯ such that [a] R(t¯) = t, [b] R(t¯]) = t], and [c] (t¯, c¯, t¯]) ∈ ⊗¯. [c] and
[Csq2] implies [d] t¯⊕(c¯) = t¯]. Finally, I argue, in steps, that t∪{c¯} by [a] equals
R(t¯)∪{c¯}, which by inspection equals R(t¯⊕(c¯)), which by ([d]) equals R(t¯]), which
by [b] equals t].
(b). Lemma B.4[(a)⇒(e)] implies R|T¯ :T¯→T is a bijection. Thus the assumptions
of Lemma A.15 are met at [1] its (I, T, (Ci)i∈I ,⊗) equal to (I¯ , T¯ , (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ , ⊗¯) here,
[2] its ι:I→I ′ equal to idI¯ :I¯→I¯ here, [3] its τ :T→T ′ equal to R|T¯ :T¯→T here, and [4]
its δ:∪i∈ICi→C ′ equal to id∪i¯∈I¯ C¯i¯ :∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯→∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯ here. Also, the definition of ⊗′
in Lemma A.15 coincides with the definition of ⊗ here. Also, the transparent defini-
tions of δ and ι here, and the definition of (C ′i′)i′∈I′ in Lemma A.15, imply (C
′
i′)i′∈I′
there equals (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ here. Hence Lemma A.15 implies that (I¯ , T, (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ ,⊗) is an
NCF form, and that [(I¯ , T¯ , (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ , ⊗¯), (I¯ , T, (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ ,⊗), idI¯ , R|T¯ , id∪i¯∈I¯Ci¯ ] is an
NCF isomorphism.
It remains to show that (I¯ , T, (C¯i¯)i¯∈I¯ ,⊗) is a CsetF form. Since the previous
paragraph showed that it is an NCF form, it suffices to show that its preform
(T,∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯,⊗) is an CsetP preform. By assumption, (T¯,∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯, ⊗¯) is a CsqPa˜
preform. Thus the assumption of part (a) is met at (T¯, C¯, ⊗¯) = (T¯,∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯, ⊗¯).
Further, part (b) defines T and ⊗ just as part (a) does. Hence part (a) implies
(T,∪i¯∈I¯C¯i¯,⊗) is an CsetP preform. 2
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